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INTRODUCTION
To do her part to help law enforcement, a Louisiana rape vic-
tim voluntarily provided her DNA so that her genetic information
might help bring her attacker to justice.I After all, DNA saves lives
and helps solve crimes.2 Much to her horror, her DNA did not lead
law enforcement to her rapist; rather, her DNA sample led to her
brother's conviction for a separate string of crimes.3 In Louisiana,
DNA profiles from victims and suspects remain warehoused in local
DNA databases indefinitely.4 As a result, this woman essentially be-
came a genetic informant on her brother. At arguably her most vul-
nerable point, this rape victim felt betrayed, because the police "did
everything behind [her] back."5 Her brother's attorney cautioned
that "[s]uch cases might make rape victims think twice before re-
porting an attack."6
Louisiana's unexpected use of crime victim DNA and local
DNA databases7 to investigate crimes is not unique. This also occurs
in Maryland, where police in Baltimore City and Prince George's
County retain crime victim DNA in underregulated local DNA
1. See Ellen Nakashima, From DNA ofFamily, a Tool to Make Arrests: Privacy Advo-
cates Say the Emerging Practice Turns Relatives into Genetic Informants, WASH. POST, Apr.
21, 2008, at A01.
2. See Jessica D. Gabel, Indecent Exposure: Genes Are More than a Brand Name
Label in the DNA Database Debate, 42 U. BALT. L. REv. 561, 561 (2013); see also
DNASAvEs, http://dnasaves.org (last visited Oct. 6, 2014).
3. Nakashima, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. For the purposes of this article, "databank" is used to refer to the repository
of data at the national level of CODIS and "database" is used to refer to the state
and local levels of CODIS.
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databases from known persons that police cannot enter into the
FBI's Combined Offender DNA Indexing System national DNA
databank (CODIS).8 These local police departments also maintain
underregulated databases of DNA profiles from crime scenes that
contain low-quality samples that are not permitted in CODIS.9
Every week these local underregulated databases are compared to
find complete or partial matches that link a known individual to
crime scene evidence, or an unknown individual across multiple
crime scenes' 0-with unintended consequences.
Louisiana and Maryland are not the exception, but rather the
norm. The more than 190 public DNA laboratories that participate
in the FBI's CODIS program also maintain databases at the state or
local level 1 that may contain DNA from known persons or crime
scenes that cannot be entered into the national databank.12 The
FBI closely regulates the categories of DNA profiles that can be en-
tered into the national databank, but not the categories that partici-
8. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 657 F. Supp. 2d 630, 634-35 (D. Md. 2009)
(describing unregulated operation of Prince George's County's local DNA
database), affd, 690 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2012).
9. CECELIA CROUSE & D.H. KAYE, THE RETENTION AND SUBSEQUENT USE OF Sus-
PECT, ELIMINATION, AND VICIM DNA SAMPLES OR RECORDS 2-5 (rev. ed. 2001) (dis-
cussing types of samples local and state databases contain).
10. See Brandon L. Garrett & Erin Murphy, Too Much Information, SLATE (Feb.
12, 2013, 8:22 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/jurispru-
dence/?2013/02/dna collection at the-supreme court maryland v king.html.
11. See CODIS and NDIS Factsheet, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/bio
metric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Nov. 8, 2014). Al-
though CODIS is used as a generic term to describe the network of police DNA
databanks, it is actually software developed by the FBI for DNA laboratories to
operate state and local DNA databases and to manage the DNA information they
upload to the national DNA databank. Id.
12. While the FBI does not collect data from state and local laboratories that
participate in CODIS regarding retention practices of "nonoffender samples,"
such as crime victim, elimination, or suspect samples that cannot be entered into
the national databank, in 2000, the National Commission on the Future of DNA
Evidence surveyed participating CODIS laboratories regarding current retention
practices for nonoffender samples. Of the nineteen laboratories that responded,
"[h]alf . . . determined that DNA profiles would be entered into [local] and [state]
databases based on court opinions and 'analyst discretion' (defined as 'we import
what we're comfortable importing')." CROUSE & KAYE, supra note 9, at 3. Seven
laboratories did not have an internal CODIS manual with guidelines for analyst
discretion. Id. Over two-thirds of the laboratories had no written definition of what
samples constitute an elimination sample or a suspect sample. Id. Two of the labo-
ratories entered a victim sample into the database if police notified the laboratory
that the victim "is known to be associated with criminal activity." Id. These two
laboratories also offered a quality assurance rationale to justify the inclusion of
victims' samples. Id.
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pating laboratories can store and search in databases at the local
and state levels, creating a gap in regulation.13
Precisely because of this regulatory gap, police may expand un-
derregulated local and state CODIS databases using DNA samples
from crime victims, individuals who voluntarily provide elimination
samples to aid an investigation, or samples collected from persons
pursuant to a court order or warrant.14 Police may also expand un-
derregulated databases using crime scene DNA samples that do not
meet the FBI's quality standards for inclusion in the national
databank.15
This is the next wave of DNA database expansion. Unfortu-
nately, it is accompanied by the perverse consequences that flow
from allowing law enforcement to decide which citizens should be
subjected to lifelong genetic surveillance in databases that are
trawled for matches or partial matches to crime scene DNA samples
rejected by the FBI. These consequences could very well endanger
public confidence in the core mission of the regulated national
DNA databank without any corresponding utility.
To better understand the current legal environment, Part I of
this Article reviews the existing regulations and uses of DNA
databases. From there, Part II addresses the current wave of expan-
sion of underregulated state and local DNA databases. Turning to
the root cause of some potential problems, Part III identifies the
existing gaps in statutory and judicial regulation of law enforce-
13. The FBI specifically requires laboratories participating in CODIS to:
(1) be an accredited laboratory; (2) have the status of a criminal justice agency;
(3) have the status of a laboratory audited to FBI quality assurance standards;
(4) comply with federal expungement law; (5) comply with federal law restricting
access to information; and (6) limit demographic or criminal justice information
directly linked to a profile. See FBI, NDIS OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES MANUAL § 2.1
(2014), available at http://static.fbi.gov/docs/NDIS-Procedures-Manual-Final-1-31-
2013-1.pdf. The FBI does not require participating laboratories to ensure the cate-
gories of DNA profiles that may be stored and searched in state and local databases
conform to the permissible categories of profiles in the national databank. See id.
§ 3.1. Also, the FBI does not require participating laboratories to adhere to the
data standards for DNA profiles submitted to the national databank. See id. § 4.2.
14. See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see also Joseph Goldstein, Police
Agencies Are Assembling Records of DNA, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2013, at Al.
15. See CROUSE & KAYE, supra note 9. The FBI standards for data entered into
the national databank require: (1) that crime scene samples be associated with a
putative perpetrator; (2) limitations on mixtures of DNA; (3) a ban on low-tem-
plate or low-copy-number profiles; and (4) the submitting laboratory to confirm
that the data being submitted is sufficiently discriminating to result in only one
match in the databank. FBI, NDIS OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note
13, § 4.2.1.
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ment agencies' DNA databases at the state and local level, with a
particular focus on legal challenges to underregulated DNA
databases in Maryland as a case example. Finally, the Conclusion
identifies the objectives of regulation and makes specific proposals
for legislatures to consider.
I.
EXISTING REGULATIONS AND USES
OF DNA DATABASES
A. Background on Forensic DNA
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis is one of the most im-
portant advances in forensic science.16 DNA testing provides police
with an accurate and reliable method of comparing the DNA of a
known person to DNA left at a crime scene by an unknown perpe-
trator.17 The biological properties of DNA make it an ideal piece of
evidence for police to focus on when investigating crime. Only a
miniscule amount of biological material is needed to produce the
DNA profile that law enforcement uses to compare crime scene
DNA to DNA collected from a known person.1 8 The crime scene
DNA can be from different bodily fluids, such as blood, saliva, or
semen, or any cell with a nucleus (including involuntarily shed skin
cells) because an individual's entire DNA sequence can be found in
the nucleus of any single cell.19 Police can easily collect a DNA sam-
ple from a willing suspect with a cotton swab rubbed on the inside
of the cheek, 20 and may also constitutionally collect DNA surrepti-
tiously from involuntarily shed skin cells or other biological
material.2 1
16. See generally DNA Evidence Basics, NAT'L INST. JUST., http://nij.gov/topics/
forensics/evidence/dna/basics/Pages/welcome.aspx (last visited Nov. 8, 2014)
(providing an overview of what sorts of DNA analyses are conducted in criminal
cases and how those analyses are used).
17. See JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING: BIOLOGY, TECHNOLOGY, AND
GENETICS OF STR MARKERS 1-2 (2d ed. 2005).
18. See DNA Evidence: Basics of Identifying, Gathering and Transporting, NAT'L
INST. JusT., http://nij.gov/topics/forensics/evidence/dna/basics/Pages/identify
ing-to-transporting.aspx (last visited Nov. 8, 2014).
19. BUTLER, supra note 17, at 29.
20. See DNA Buccal Collection Kit Training and Procedures, FBI (Aug. 8, 2014),
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/federal-dna-database/buccal-
collection-kit-information. The collection of cheek cells from within the mouth
cavity is referred to as a "buccal swab." Id.
21. See, e.g., Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753, 755 (Md. 2014) (holding that a
Fourth Amendment search did not occur when police collected and analyzed ge-
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Because an individual's full DNA sequence is very large,
CODIS utilizes a DNA profile that consists of only thirteen locations
on certain chromosomes (13 CODIS Core Loci).22 The 13 CODIS
Core Loci provide for easy comparison of DNA profiles of known
individuals to DNA profiles collected from crime scenes, helping to
find matches that may identify the perpetrator of a crime.23 A
matching sequence of 13 CODIS Core Loci is ordinarily a rare
enough event to uniquely identify a person as the source of DNA
collected at a crime scene. 24 A perfect match between two complete
profiles shows a common source.25 A partial match, on the other
hand, may identify a family member as the source of crime scene
DNA because related persons inherit their DNA profiles from the
same family tree.26 A partial match may also happen by chance be-
cause low-quality crime scene profiles may not have sufficient infor-
mation to reliably discriminate between persons who may be
potential contributors.27
netic material from the armrest of a chair in which the defendant had been sitting
during an interview).
22. BUTLER, supra note 17, at 94-97. This DNA profile is unique enough that
when two of these DNA profiles are compared, "the average random match
probability is rarer than one in a trillion unrelated individuals." Id.
23. Id. at 438. Police use of DNA is increasingly more sophisticated than just
identifying suspects from visible stains of biological evidence like blood or semen
found at crime scenes. Today, police are trained to collect biological evidence
from a wide range of non-stained surfaces or articles that invisible cellular material
may have been deposited on, such as doorknobs, steering wheels, hats, masks, or
bandanas, to name a few. See DNA Evidence: Basics of Identifying, Gathering and Trans-
porting, NAT'L INST. JUST., http://nij.gov/topics/forensics/evidence/dna/basics/
Pages/identifying-to-transporting.aspx (last visited Nov. 8, 2014). Police are also
trained to collect and use DNA for purposes beyond identification of a suspect. For
example, DNA may change a defense in a rape case from alibi to consent by plac-
ing an individual at a location where he claims not to have been, or undermine a
claim of self-defense by showing a suspect's DNA was collected from a weapon. See
id.
24. See BUTLER, supra note 17, at 94-95. In the context of the federal DNA
databank, "match" and "hit" are defined terms. A "match" occurs when a CODIS
search results in an association between two or more DNA profiles, after which
designated laboratory personnel from each affected laboratory start a process to
confirm the match. See FBI, NDIS OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES MANUAL, sufr note
13, § 6.1.1. A "hit" occurs when a confirmed or verified match aids one or more
open investigations. See id. § 6.6.1.
25. Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to
Catch Offenders' Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 248, 251 (2006).
26. See FBI, NDIS OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 13, app. G.
27. PETER GILL, MISLEADING DNA EVIDENCE: REASONS FOR MISCARRIAGES OF
JUSTICE 125 (2014) ("Random match probabilities are more likely with low-tem-
plate DNA profiles that are multi-contributor mixtures. False positives can occur as
a result of 'composite results' from two or more contributors.") (citations omit-
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In the 1980s, police began to use DNA to investigate unsolved
cases in which biological evidence from a crime scene could be ana-
lyzed to develop a DNA profile, which could then be compared to
DNA profiles collected from a group of possible suspects.28 DNA
was also used in cases where a suspect was known. The police could
compare a known suspect's DNA profile to biological evidence
found at the scene of a crime.29 The potential value of databases of
DNA from known individuals to provide investigative leads for un-
solved crimes-as well as the substantial privacy concerns impli-
cated when law enforcement collects, retains, and distributes DNA
of known persons-was recognized early on.30
The first generation of forensic DNA testing, however, had
practical limitations that checked the growth of DNA databases and
limited their use to crimes where the DNA evidence was highly rele-
vant to the identity of the perpetrator: early tests were expensive;3 1
they required a blood sample from the suspect;32 and, relative to
ted). In a mixed DNA profile of two or more persons, especially low-level mixtures
of DNA, the "DNA data itself may demonstrate that different explanations are pos-
sible." Peter Gill et al., DNA Commission of the International Society of Forensic Genetics:
Recommendations on the Interpretation of Mixtures, 160 FORENSIC ScI. INT'L 90, 100
(2006). For a plain-language explanation of the challenges of mixtures of low-qual-
ity DNA, see Norah Rudin & Keith Inman, The Discomfort of Thought-A Discussion
with John Butler, CACNEws, 1st'Quarter 2012, at 8, 9-11.
The 2005-06 annual report for the United Kingdom's DNA databank further
illustrates the problem of partial matches in a large database:
Since May 2001, 182,612 crime scene profiles have been matched. A single
suspect was reported for 132,178 of these match groups. A list of potential
suspects was produced for the remainder. The identification of more than
one potential suspect as the source of the DNA at some scenes is largely due to
the significant proportion of crime scene sample profiles that are partial.
NAT'L DNA DATABASE STRATEGY BD., NATIONAL DNA DATABASE ANNUAL REPORT
2005-2006, at 35 (2006) (U.K.), available at http://www.genewatch.org/uploads/
?f03c6d66a9b354535738483c1c3d49e4/DNA-report200506.pdf.
28. BUTLER, supra note 17, at 2-4 (citing JOSEPH WAMBAUGH, THE BLOODING:
THE TRUE STORY OF THE NARBOROUGH VILLAGE MURDERS (1995)). Wambaugh tells
the true story of an early use of DNA evidence: to solve the slayings of two teenage
girls, the police in this case were the first to use AlecJeffrey's discovery of a method
to create a profile of the human genome with enough discrimination to exclude
the entire target population of 4000 adult men as the source of semen at the crime
scene except for the perpetrator of the crimes. Id. at 3.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIc ScI-
ENCE 111, 113-16 (1992) (recognizing the value of DNA databases in investigating
"crimes without suspects" as well as the potential for future misuse inherent in
such databases).
31. BUTLER, supra note 17, at 325.
32. See id. at 4.
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the subnanogram sensitivity of current technology, DNA profiles
could only be developed from large amounts of biological evidence
collected at a crime scene. 3 However, a visible amount of semen or
blood meant certain identity evidence of the perpetrator.34
As awareness of the power of DNA grew, the increased demand
for DNA analysis spurred the development of swifter, cheaper, and
more sensitive tests. 5 The practical limitation of a blood draw as a
means to collect a DNA sample from a person no longer exists; po-
lice can readily-and surreptitiously-collect a person's DNA sam-
ple from a discarded cigarette butt, chewing gum, saliva on a straw,
or sweat on a chair.36 Mass screenings of possible suspects can be
accomplished with swabs of saliva.37 A visible amount of a bodily
fluid like semen, blood, or saliva at a crime scene is also no longer
needed; police can collect and analyze trace amounts of "touch"
DNA from surfaces like doorknobs, steering wheels, or windows.38
"Touch" DNA is used in the prosecution of property crimes, drug
offenses, and quality-of-life offenses like vandalism or trespass.39
Unlike a visible amount of bodily fluid found at a crime scene, how-
ever, the relevance and reliability of low-level DNA profiles from
surfaces likely to contain DNA from more than one person can be
very uncertain. 40
33. See id.
34. See GILL, MISLEADING DNA EVIDENCE: REASONS FOR MISCARRIAGES OF JUs-
TICE, supra note 27, at 14.
35. Cf Peter Finn, Revolution Underway in Use of DNA Profiles; Bid to Link U.S.
Databanks Is Crime-Solving Edge, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 1997, at B04 (reporting on
how new DNA technology was poised to expand DNA databases).
36. Id.
37. Jeffrey S. Grand, Note, The Blooding of America: Privacy and the DNA Dragnet,
23 CARDozo L. REv. 2277, 2278 (2002). Grand also notes that in a mass-screening
situation-also called a "DNA dragnet"-police often do not have probable cause
to obtain a search warrant for any one individual in a group and thus need con-
sent. See id. at 2295 & n.81. Usually, consenting to DNA testing excludes the target,
but if any individual refuses, he comes under suspicion. See id. at 2284 & n.31, 2297
& n.95.
38. See, e.g., Max Houck & Lucy Houck, What Is Touch DNA?, Scientific Ameri-
can (Aug. 8, 2008), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/experts-touch-dna-
jonbenet-ramsey/; DNA Evidence: Basics of Identifying, Gathering and Transporting,
supra note 23.
39. See JOHN K. ROMAN ET AL., URBAN INST. JUST. PoL'Y CTR., THE DNA FIELD
EXPERIMENT: COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF DNA IN HIGH-VOLUME
CRIMES (2008), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/?411697_dna_
fieldexperiment.pdf; Nancy Ritter, DNA Solves Property Crimes (But Are We Ready For
That?), NAT'L INST. JUST. J., October 2009, at 2.
40. See sources cited supra note 27. The FBI bans low-level DNA profiles from
the national databank, but not from state and local databases that participate in
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This revolution in forensic DNA technology has created an op-
portunity for law enforcement to aggressively expand the collection
and retention of DNA samples from known persons and crime
scenes. 4 The first wave of expansion occurred at the national and
state levels of CODIS: Congress and nearly every state relentlessly
expanded the categories of convicted offenders and arrestees sub-
ject to mandatory DNA collection laws;4 2 the courts routinely up-
held these laws against challenges; 43 and powerful special interest
groups advocated for mandatory DNA sampling from all convicted
offenders and arrestees.4 4
The second-generation expansion of forensic DNA testing is
now occurring largely under the radar at the state and local levels
of CODIS. Precisely because federal law limits DNA profiles of
known individuals in the national databank to persons who must
CODIS. See FBI, NDIS OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 13,
§ 4.2.1.10. The FBI also bans any partial or mixed profile that is likely to result in
more than one match in the databank. See id. § 4.2.1.7.
41. Cf Rapid DNA or Rapid DNA Analysis, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/
lab/biometric-analysis/codis/rapid-dna-analysis (last visited Nov. 9, 2014) (noting
that the ongoing development of Rapid DNA technology will allow "automated
extraction, amplification, separation, detection and allele calling without human
intervention").
42. See Forensic DNA Policy, DNARESOURCE.COM, http://www.dnaresource
.com/?policy.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2013). Twenty-eight states and the federal
government now require DNA collection and analysis from at least some arrestees.
See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1968 (2013); Julie Samuels et al., Collecting
DNA from Arrestees: Implementation Lessons, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., June 2012, at 19.
43. See Samuels, supra note 42; see also, e.g., United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d
813, 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding the constitutionality of a federal statute au-
thorizing the collection of DNA from certain federal offenders on parole, proba-
tion, or supervised release, absent individualized suspicion that the offenders had
committed additional crimes); Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2004) (up-
holding the constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute authorizing the department of
corrections to collect and store the DNA profiles of convicted felons); Groceman v.
United States, 354 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2004) (upholding the constitutionality of a
federal statute authorizing the collection of DNA from prisoners); United States v.
Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding the collection of a DNA profile
pursuant to a federal DNA collection statute constituted a reasonable search and
seizure under the "special needs exception" to the Fourth Amendment); Jones v.
Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992) (upholding the constitutionality of a Virginia
statute authorizing the department of corrections to collect and store the DNA
profiles of convicted felons); State v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19 (Md. 2004) (upholding
the constitutionality of a Maryland statute authorizing the collection of DNA
profiles of certain convicted persons).
44. See, e.g., About the DNA Resource Center, NAT'L CTR. FOR VIcTIMS OF CRIME,
http://victimsofcrime.org/our-programs/dna-resource-center/about-the-dna-re
source-center (last visited Nov. 9, 2014) (explaining the organization's commit-
ment to increased use of DNA sampling from convicted offenders).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
6472014]
NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW [Vol. 69:639
submit to DNA collection during a criminal prosecution,45 police
are exploiting the underregulated state and local levels of CODIS
to retain DNA collected during investigations.4 6 DNA profiles col-
lected from a crime scene and analyzed during an investigation are
called "casework" samples.4 7 To be eligible for entry into the "foren-
sic index" of the national databank, a casework sample must: (1) be
reasonably probative of the identity of the perpetrator of a crime;
(2) be not from a known person; and (3) not consist of complex
mixtures or partial profiles that may hit to more than one person in
45. The Federal DNA Identification Act permits the FBI to operate a national
databank to store and search DNA profiles collected from persons convicted of
crimes, persons who have been charged in an indictment or information with a
crime, persons detained under the authority of the United States, and relatives of
missing persons who voluntarily provide a DNA sample in NDIS. 42 U.S.C.
§ 14132(a) (2012). The NDIS Operational Procedures Manual expressly bans the
inclusion of victim DNA and DNA voluntarily submitted for elimination purposes
in the national databank. FBI, NDIS OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra
note 13, § 4.2.1.8. However, the Privacy Act Notice for the National DNA Index
System suggests that the Department ofJustice may have at one point considered
retaining crime victim DNA to identify perpetrators of crimes who carried DNA of
the victim away from the crime scene. 61 Fed. Reg. 37,495 (Jul. 18, 1996); FBI,
NDIS OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 13, app. B (including in the
"[c]ategories of individuals covered by [the National DNA Index System]: . . . Vic-
tims: Persons, living or dead, who have been victims of crimes where the perpetra-
tor of the crime may have carried DNA of the victim away from the crime scene.").
46. See Goldstein, supra note 14. On a 2013 episode of National Public Radio's
Talk of the Nation, a caller from Florida described an increasingly familiar scenario
with casework samples:
Yeah, I actually had exactly this experience that you were talking about. I have
a small shop, and it was robbed in the night, and we called the police, and
they came out and did the swabs, and they asked for samples from all of myself
and my entire staff.
They did not solve the crime ... and they did not, in my opinion, fully explain
that this DNA was going to go into a database for future use. And I feel like
now, in effect, the police department, sheriffs department, has a, you know, a
DNA of my entire staff. None of us are criminals. I don't think that they have a
right to that information. I don't think they fully explained that we're going to
keep this DNA and use it for future things.
Talk of the Nation: After SCOTUS DNA Ruling, What Changes for Police? (NPR radio
broadcast June 17, 2013), available at http://www.npr.org/2013/06/17/1927400
45/after-scotus-dna-ruling-what-changes-for-police.
47. See CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, supra note 11 (describing "forensic
(casework) DNA samples" as samples that are "attributed to the putative perpetra-
tor" and collected from a crime scene as evidence, as opposed to samples taken
directly from a suspect).
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the databank.48 These limitations do not exist at the state and local
levels of CODIS. 4 9
A regulatory gap allows state and local laboratories to collect,
retain, and distribute their casework samples in the CODIS network
at the state and local levels; federal law leaves to the states the regu-
lation of these databases of DNA profiles that cannot be uploaded
to the national databank.50 All states mandate DNA collection from
certain criminals, but only a few states regulate the collection, re-
tention, or distribution of casework DNA samples.5' The courts
have similarly failed to develop new rules or faithfully apply existing
rules to safeguard the privacy interests of persons who have volun-
teered their DNA to help police investigate a crime.5 2 The result is
that people who have not been convicted of a crime end up under
lifelong genetic surveillance.53
New technology continues to expand the reach of underregu-
lated databases. New advances, such as increases in the sensitivity of
DNA testing, the lower cost of testing, simplified collection tech-
niques, rapid results, and enhancements to the CODIS software cre-
ate more opportunities for police to collect DNA from crime scenes
and known individuals as a routine part of police work.54 Increased
48. FBI, NDIS OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 13,
§§ 4.2.1.7-4.2.1.8.
49. Cf id. §§ 4, 6 (explaining that the FBI guidelines are statutorily author-
ized by Congress and apply to CODIS and the national databank).
50. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b) (2012) (stating that the national databank can
only contain samples that meet federal regulatory requirements); FBI, NDIS OPER-
ATIONAL PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 13, §§ 4, 6.
51. Michelle Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement's Greatest Surveillance
Tool?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 767, 774-80 (1999).
52. See, e.g., Varriale v. State, 96 A.3d 793 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014) In Varri-
ale, the defendant had "voluntarily provided DNA samples to the police in order to
eliminate himself as a suspect in an alleged rape. Although the DNA sample
cleared him of the alleged rape, it disclosed his involvement in an unrelated bur-
glary that took place a few years earlier." Id. at 794-95. The defendant argued that
his DNA profile should not have been retained in the state and local DNA
databases once he had been "cleared of suspicion in the investigation in which the
sample was obtained." Id. at 798. The court disagreed, and held that the Fourth
Amendment does not regulate the retention of a DNA profile in a local CODIS
database even when such retention exceeds the bounds of consent upon which the
defendant agreed to have the sample removed from his body. Id. at 797-98.
53. See id.
54. See FBI, CODIS: COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM (2010), available at http://
www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-brochure-2010. The
next generation of CODIS software will provide "enhanced kinship analysis tools"
that will allow police to use CODIS databases-particularly at the state and local
levels-to more effectively target family members of persons in the national
databank. Id. at 1.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
2014] 649
NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW [Vol. 69:639
federal funding may encourage police to exploit these opportuni-
ties.55 Accordingly, the number of profiles in underregulated state
and local indices that cannot be uploaded to the national DNA
databank is likely to continue to increase dramatically in the pres-
ence of lax database laws.
B. Federal Regulations
In 1990, the FBI launched a pilot piece of software to serve
fourteen state and local DNA laboratories. 56 This software allowed
police to generate investigative leads from biological evidence left
at the scene of a crime.5 7 The goal was to share DNA profile infor-
mation in a databank described as a national DNA index system
(NDIS).58 Participating state and local laboratories could upload
qualifying DNA profiles (also called DNA records) developed from
crime scene evidence to the NDIS "forensic index" and DNA
profiles of known individuals convicted of serious crimes to the
NDIS "convicted offender" index.5 9 This CODIS precursor
searched for matches within the forensic index to identify crimes
that might have been committed by a serial offender, as well as for
matches between the forensic index and the convicted offender in-
dex to identify possible suspects.60
The software also provided participating local and state DNA
laboratories with the ability to operate a local DNA index system
(LDIS) and to share DNA profiles with other DNA laboratories in
their state through a state DNA index system (SDIS).61 The availa-
bility of the CODIS platform to retain and search DNA profiles pro-
vided local law enforcement laboratories the opportunity to
compare DNA profiles from their casework that could not be
55. Over the past decade, the federal government has repeatedly increased
funding to state and local laboratories to expand the reach of DNA collection and
databases. In 2006, the federal government expanded the use of CODIS grants
available for the creation of DNA profiles of arrested individuals. See DNA Finger-
print Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 1003, 119 Stat. 3085 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14135(a) (1) (2012)). In 2013, Congress enacted a law that
provides funding for up to the entire first-year cost of implementing a DNA arres-
tee testing program. Katie Sepich Enhanced DNA Collection Act of 2012, 112 Pub.
L. No. 112-253, § 3, 126 Stat. 2407, 2408 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14137a (2012)).
56. CODIS and ADIS Fact Sheet, supra note 11.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. CROUSE & KAYE, supra note 9, at 3.
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uploaded to the national DNA databank.62 These databases may po-
tentially include partial or mixed DNA profiles from crime scene
evidence, of crime victims, of persons who voluntarily provided
DNA samples to be eliminated from crime scene evidence, and of
suspects who were not arrested or convicted.63
While CODIS was still in its pilot phase, the National Research
Council published a seminal report on the use of DNA technology
in the criminal justice system (NRC I).64 NRC I presciently observed
that "[i] f DNA profiles of samples from a population were stored in
computer databanks (databases), DNA typing could be applied in
,crimes without suspects."65 NRC I acknowledged the general simi-
larity between a fingerprint databank and a DNA databank, but de-
cisively rejected that analogy because "ordinary fingerprints and
DNA profiles differ substantially in ways that bear on the creation
and design of a national DNA profile databank."66 NRC I
explained:
Confidentiality and security of DNA-related information are es-
pecially important and difficult issues, because we are in the
midst of two extraordinary technological revolutions that show
no signs of abating: in molecular biology, which is yielding an
explosion of information about human genetics, and in com-
puter technology, which is moving towards national and inter-
national networks connecting growing information
resources.67
To address these concerns, NRC I recommended limiting the
scope of who would be subject to DNA collection and avoiding test-
ing genetic locations that are associated with traits and diseases.66
NRC I also recommended maintaining identity information confi-
dentially. 69 This would minimize the potential for misuse that could
62. Cf id. at 2 (stating that while policies and procedures for including sam-
ples in the national databank are clear, policies and procedures for inclusion in
state and local databases are much less clear).
63. See id.
64. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 30.
65. Id. at 111.
66. Id. at 112-13.
67. Id. at 113-14.
68. Id. The 13 CODIS Core Loci are found on "non-coding" regions of an
individual's chromosomes; that is, regions that do not store information that is
used to make proteins. BUTLER, supra note 17, at 22, 94-97. The 13 CODIS Core
Loci were selected to make up the standard CODIS DNA profile in the belief that
they did not correspond to any particular traits or characteristics. See H.R. REP. No.
106-900, pt. 1, at 27 (2000); BUTLER, supra note 17, at 22, 94, 443-44.
69. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 30, at 114-15.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
2014] 651
NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW [Vol. 69:639
occur if DNA identity information were linked to other databases
that contain medical, criminal, social services, financial, or credit
information.70 It was precisely these privacy concerns that signifi-
cantly influenced the earliest legislators authorizing the creation of
a national DNA databank to include in the federal statute substan-
tial restrictions on the collection, retention, and distribution of
DNA and related information.71
Following the 1994 congressional authorization for a coordi-
nated system of national, state, and local DNA databases, the FBI
implemented the CODIS national DNA databank.72 A relentless ex-
pansion of national, state, and local DNA databases quickly fol-
lowed. By 1999, all fifty states required DNA collection and analysis
from at least some convicted individuals.73 In 2000, Congress fol-
lowed suit and required DNA collection and analysis from individu-
als convicted of a limited set of federal offenses. 74 Congress
extended that requirement in 2004 to all individuals convicted of
federal felonies.75 In 2004, Congress expressly permitted the FBI to
accept into the national DNA databank DNA profiles of arrested
individuals.76 In 2005 and 2006, Congress extended federal DNA
testing to all arrestees.77 Similarly, today all fifty states require DNA
collection from all individuals convicted of felonies, and twenty-
eight states require DNA collection and analysis from at least some
arrestees.78
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, § 210304(a) (1)-(3), 108 Stat. 2069 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 14132 (2012)).
72. The FBI and DNA, Part 1-A Look at the Nationwide System that Helps Solve
Crime, FBI (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/november/?
dna112311.
73. See Hibbert, supra note 51.
74. See DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546,
§ 3(a)(1)-(2), 114 Stat. 2728 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 14135a(a)(1)-(2) (2012)).
75. See Debbie Smith Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 203,
118 Stat. 2269-71 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d) (2012)).
76. See § 203, 118 Stat. at 2269-71.
77. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
248, § 155, 120 Stat. 587 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A)
(2012)); DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 1004, 119 Stat.
3085-86 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a (2012)); 28 C.F.R. § 28.12
(2008).
78. See Hibbert, supra note 51; Samuels, supra note 42; see also State DNA
Database Laws-Qualifying Offenses, DNARESOURCE (Sept. 2011), http://www.dna
resource.com/documents/statequalifyingoffenses201 1.pdf.
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In line with the expanding scope of persons subject to
mandatory DNA collection, the number of laboratories using the
CODIS software expanded to include over 190 state and local DNA
databases.7 9 Crime laboratories are also permitted to outsource
DNA analysis to private companies that satisfy the FBI's quality as-
surance standards.80 The combined effects of these expansions
have caused the CODIS national DNA databank to grow exponen-
tially: in 2000, there were about 400,000 offender profiles; by 2006,
there were about four million offender profiles and 50,000 arrestee
profiles.8 1 According to the most recent available data, CODIS now
contains over eleven million offender profiles and 1.9 million arres-
tee profiles. 2 The FBI claims to have produced over 219,700 hits
assisting in more than 210,700 investigations, despite not tracking
the number of convictions that are the result of a hit between DNA
profiles from different crime scenes or a DNA profile from a crime
scene and an offender profile.8
Nevertheless, the FBI is limited in what profiles it can include
in the national databank. 84 NDIS can only include profiles author-
ized by statute.85 Further, Congress expressly prohibited the FBI
from including in NDIS any DNA samples that are voluntarily sub-
mitted for elimination purposes.86 The FBI implemented addi-
tional quality standards that restrict the inclusion of profiles of
known persons and from crime scenes.8 7 The FBI does not allow
state or local CODIS laboratories to upload enhanced DNA profiles
created from very low-level amounts of human cells.88 The concern
is that part of the profile may be an artifact created during the test-
ing process that enhanced testing techniques have amplified to
seemingly detectable levels.8 9 The imperative for reliable matches
between DNA profiles in the national databank also means that the
FBI limits state and local laboratories to uploading only profiles
that are reasonably probative of the identity of a putative perpetra-
79. See CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, supra note 11.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. CODIS-NDIS Statistics, FBI, http://wvw.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-
analysis/codis/ndis-statistics (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
83. See id.
84. See CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, supra note 11.
85. See supra note 45.
86. See id.
87. FBI, NDIS OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES MAUAL, supra note 13, § 4.
88. Id. § 4.2.1.10.
89. See id.
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tor.90 Partial profiles and mixtures of DNA from crime scenes are
also prohibited in the national databank unless the expected num-
ber of contributors to the mixture is fewer than the number of
matches expected by chance from a search of the relentlessly ex-
panding databank.9 1
C. State Regulation
States are responsible for developing their own regulations
governing state and local DNA databases. 92 A minority of states reg-
ulate the categories of DNA profiles that can be stored and
searched at the state or local levels. For example, Alaska permits
only certain categories of DNA samples that cannot be uploaded to
NDIS to be retained in the state database.93 It also prohibits catego-
ries of samples from being entered in the state identification system
that are not expressly permitted.94 A local database practice that is
in conflict with state law is preempted.95 The only exemption to this
regulation is that it must not prevent "a local law enforcement
agency from performing DNA identification analysis in individual
cases to assist law enforcement officials and prosecutors in the prep-
aration and use of DNA evidence for presentation in court."9 6
By contrast, Michigan allows a suspect's DNA to be taken, but
limits that "any other DNA identification profile obtained by the
department shall not be permanently retained by the department
90. See 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a) (1)-(4) (2012); see also FBI, NDIS OPERATIONAL
PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 13, §§ 4.2.1.8.
91. The FBI bans low-level DNA profiles from the national databank through
its software licensing agreement with state and local CODIS laboratories. FBI,
NDIS OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 13, § 4.2.1.10. The software
agreement also includes the FBI ban on any partial or mixed profile that may
result in more than one match in the databank. Id. at § 4.2.1.7.
92. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
93. The Alaska statute allows the retention of DNA records from persons ar-
rested or convicted in the state of a crime against a person or felony under certain
statutes, certain minors adjudicated as delinquents, voluntary donors, certain per-
sons required to register as sex offenders or child kidnappers, and anonymous
donors for use in forensic validation, quality control, or population and statistical
databases, as well as samples from crime scene evidence and unidentified human
remains. ALASKA STAT. § 44.41.035(b) (2013).
94. Id. ("[S]amples not subject to testing ... may not be entered into, or
made a part of, the DNA identification registration system.").
95. Id. § 44.41.035(d) (3) (stating that local law enforcement may not estab-
lish or operate a DNA identification registration system unless the "procedure and
rules for the collection, analysis, storage, expungement, and use of DNA identifica-
tion data do not conflict with . . . [the] procedures and rules applicable to the
[state] DNA identification registration system").
96. Id.
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but shall be retained only as long as it is needed for a criminal in-
vestigation or criminal prosecution."9 7 Vermont permits DNA
profiles to be stored only at the state level and prohibits the entry
into the state database of DNA "voluntarily submitted or obtained
by the execution of a nontestimonial identification order ....
Other states that subject local DNA databases to statutory require-
ments include Connecticut, Missouri, and Washington.99 Yet other
states appear to prohibit the use of local DNA databases
altogether.1 00
The vast majority of states, however, do not curb or regulate
the categories of DNA samples from known persons that may be
stored in the state or local databases. These states allow the ware-
housing of far more DNA profiles and information than is allowed
at the national level or by other states. 101 In the absence of affirma-
tive statutory authorization for these local databases to contain
DNA profiles that cannot be entered into the national databank,
state law limiting the collection of DNA to qualifying offenders may
implicitly prohibit the entry of such profiles. 102 Underregulated
97. MicH. Comp. LAws § 28.176 (1990).
98. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1938 (1998).
99. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54 -102g (2012); Mo. REv. STA. § 650.057 (2012);
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.758 (2013).
100. See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 764 N.Y.S.2d 305, 314-15 (Sup. Ct. 2003)
(finding that because New York's expungement statute fails to mention local
databases, local databases are improper).
101. See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 844D-102(a) (2012) ("Nothing in this chapter
shall be construed to restrict the authority of local law enforcement to maintain its
own DNA-related databases or data banks."); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-5517 (2012)
("Nothing in this chapter shall limit or abrogate any existing authority of law en-
forcement officers to take, maintain, store and use DNA information or thumb-
print impressions for law enforcement purposes."); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-620
(2012) ("Nothing in this Chapter shall limit or abrogate any existing authority of
law enforcement officers to take, maintain, store, and utilize DNA samples for law
enforcement purposes."); NEv. REv. STAT. § 176.0912(3) (a) (2012) ("An agency of
criminal justice may establish procedures for . . . [r]etaining probative samples of
biological evidence . . . ."); 44 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2336 (2013) ("Nothing in this
chapter shall limit or abrogate any existing authority of law enforcement officers to
take, maintain, store and utilize DNA samples for law enforcement purposes."). In
Montana, when a suspect's profile is not allowed in the state DNA identification
index, there is no regulation preventing the inclusion of a suspect profile in a
separate suspect database by the crime lab. State v. Notti, 71 P.3d 1233, 1238
(Mont. 2003).
102. David M.Jaros, Preempting the Police, 55 B.C. L. REv. 1149, 1185-86 (2014)
(suggesting that state courts take advantage of the intrastate preemption doctrine
to ban certain law enforcement activities, such as the use of underregulated local
DNA databases).
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DNA databases may also violate state privacy law.' 03 Further, the
passage of state statutes to regulate the mandatory collection of
DNA from convicted offenders and arrestees is a legislative recogni-
tion of the potential for misuse of DNA databases. 0 4 Nevertheless,
state and local governments are empowered, subject to constitu-
tional limitations, to authorize official police agencies to investigate
and prevent crime to further the health, general welfare, and safety
of the community, which may include the use of underregulated
state or local DNA databases.1 05
D. Creatures of the Court
In Maryland v. King, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness of a state law requiring the
programmatic "collection and analysis" of DNA from persons
charged with a crime of violence.106 King considered the reasona-
103. For example, the Maryland Public Information Act limits categories of
information that the state may retain:
The State, a political subdivision, or a unit of the State or of a political subdivi-
sion may keep only the information about a person that: (1) is needed by the
State, the political subdivision, or the unit to accomplish a governmental pur-
pose that is authorized or required to be accomplished under: (i) a statute or
other legislative mandate; (ii) an executive order of the Governor; (iii) an
executive order of the chief executive of a local jurisdiction; or (iv) a judicial
rule; and (2) is relevant to accomplishment of the purpose.
MD. CODE ANN., GEN. PROVISIONS § 4-102 (West 2014).
Further the act specifically addressed the collection of personal information
by the government about its citizens:
(1) Personal records may not be created unless the need for the information
has been clearly established by the unit collecting the records. (2) Personal
information collected for personal records: (i) shall be appropriate and rele-
vant to the purposes for which it is collected; (ii) shall be accurate and current
to the greatest extent practicable; and (iii) may not be obtained by fraudulent
means.
Id. § 4-501. Finally, the act generally limits the information the state or a political
subdivision can keep about a person to that information which is needed and rele-
vant to accomplish a governmental purpose. Id. § 4-102. The obvious shortcoming
to a claim under a state's public information law is the lack of a statutory suppres-
sion remedy.
104. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
105. See United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1932) (stating that law
enforcement must be allowed to collect fingerprints of arrestees "for the good of
the community," despite the "slight interference with the person involved in finger
printing"); cf Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (recognizing that
local police officers engage in "community caretaking functions, totally divorced
from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the viola-
tion of a criminal statute").
106. 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
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bleness of the collection, analysis, and retention of an arrestee's
cheek cells to determine the arrestee's "DNA identification" for use
in a closely regulated database to identify other crimes (unrelated
to the crime of arrest) that the arrestee may have committed. 07
Because an arrestee's legitimate expectation of privacy is sharply
reduced when he is being processed into state custody, King did not
apply a per se Fourth Amendment analysis to a search for evidence
of criminality. 08 Instead, to determine reasonableness, King bal-
anced the governmental interest in an arrestee's DNA identifica-
tion against an arrestee's legitimate expectations of privacy in his
bodily integrity and DNA identification.109 King explained that an
arrestee's reduced expectation of privacy informed both sides of
the balance: it both strengthened the governmental interest in
DNA identification and reduced the arrestee's legitimate privacy
expectations in the collection of his DNA and use of his DNA
identification.' 10
King observed that, unlike an average citizen, an arrestee in the
custody of the police is on notice that the government has a legiti-
mate interest in his identity, including his DNA identification,
which assists police in the administrative task of determining his
criminal history."' The strength of the governmental interest fol-
lows directly from a person's volitional status:
The legitimate government interest served by the Maryland
DNA Collection Act is one that is well established: the need for
law enforcement officers in a safe and accurate way to process
and identify the persons and possessions they must take into
custody. It is beyond dispute that "probable cause provides le-
gal justification for arresting a person suspected of crime, and
for a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps
incident to arrest."112
King then balanced the strength of this governmental interest
in an arrestee's DNA identification against the physical and infor-
mational privacy interests upon which DNA collection, retention,
107. Id. at 1967.
108. Id. at 1970. The "per se rule" requires that searches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval by ajudge or magistrate, be considered
presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States
v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1972).
109. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1978.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1971 ("When probable cause exists to remove an individual from
the normal channels of society and hold him in legal custody, DNA identification
plays a critical role in serving those interests.").
112. Id. at 1970 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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and distribution intrude.' 13 King concluded that the close statutory
regulation of "DNA collection, retention, and distribution" elimi-
nated the need for a warrant to check the power of the executive
branch, and therefore held that the search was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.' 1 4 In these special circumstances, King
concluded that "[t] he need for a warrant is perhaps least when the
search involves no discretion that could properly be limited by the
'interpo [lation of] a neutral magistrate between the citizen and the
law enforcement officer."' 115 King emphasized that "DNA collec-
tion is not subject to the judgment of officers whose perspective
might be 'colored by their primary involvement in the often com-
petitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.'"116
King did not directly address the collection, analysis, and reten-
tion of DNA samples from persons who have not been arrested for
or convicted of a qualifying offense, leaving open the question of
how the Fourth Amendment applies to crime victim, elimination,
and suspect samples that have been volunteered to the police. King
did confirm that a physical intrusion like a buccal swab rubbed
against the inside of a cheek is a search under the Fourth
Amendment.1 17
Because King considered the collection and use of an arres-
tee's DNA when considering the reasonableness of the search, one
might presume that the Fourth Amendment applies to the use of
DNA collected from persons with greater expectations of privacy
than an arrestee or convicted offender. The privacy concerns for
these individuals are amplified, because at each stage in the collec-
tion and use of volunteered DNA, a police officer must exercise his
discretion without guidance from a generally applicable statute uni-
formly applied to all nonoffenders. 118 This fact distinguishes the
rationales for the use of voluntarily obtained DNA from the admin-
istrative rationales of King. For nonoffender samples, there is no
corresponding governmental interest to verifying the identity and
criminal history of an arrestee being processed into state custody
and considered for release pretrial. These factors demonstrate the
need for a neutral and detached magistrate to determine whether
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1969-80.
115. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013) (quoting Treasury Em-
ployees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667 (1989)).
116. Id. at 1970.
117. Id. at 1969.
118. Due to the fact that most federal and state DNA statutes do not regulate
the collection or use of nonoffender samples. See supra Part I.B-C.
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probable cause-a "time-tested means of effectuating Fourth
Amendment rights"' 19-justifies the use of a crime victim, elimina-
tion, or suspect sample beyond the specific use for which it was
volunteered.
Notwithstanding these different circumstances, some courts
equate the scope of a person's consent to the removal of a DNA
sample for use in one investigation to the scope of a search warrant
for DNA.120 These courts have held that once police have deter-
mined a person's DNA profile from a "lawfully" collected sample,
the Fourth Amendment does not constrain the police from using
the profile in future investigations. 1 2 1
Subsequent to King, in Varriale v. State, Maryland's intermedi-
ate appellate court broadened the definition of a "lawfully" ob-
tained DNA sample to include biological samples that police obtain
with a consent form that limits use of the samples to a particular
purpose.' 22 The court in Varriale did not view the defendant's con-
ditional consent to a bodily intrusion, or the police exceeding the
bounds of consent, as limiting the "lawfulness" of the initial collec-
tion of biological samples.123 Instead, the Varriale court read King as
establishing that a reasonable person has no expectation of privacy
119. United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972)
(stating that the probable cause standard "accords with our basic constitutional
doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved through [the] separation
of powers").
120. See, e.g., Pace v. State, 524 S.E.2d 490 (Ga. 1999). In Pace, the defendant
signed a consent form for the collection of blood and hair from his body that
stated those items would be used against him in a prosecution, and that he was a
suspect in a particular murder; the defendant did not restrict his consent to the
removal of his biological samples to that particular murder investigation. Id. at
497. Later, police used these samples to link the defendant to a second murder. Id.
The Supreme Court of Georgia considered the subsequent use of the defendant's
DNA profile to come within the scope of the consent given because the only re-
maining privacy interest was to not have one's DNA compared to crime scene evi-
dence. Id. at 497-98. The court cited Bickley v. State, which held that police were
not required to obtain a second search warrant to make subsequent use of a DNA
profile initially obtained by a warrant in an earlier, unrelated investigation. Id. at
498 (citing Bickley v. State, 489 S.E.2d 167 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)). Bickley explained
that where police do not perform further testing beyond the scope of a search
warrant, there is no search for Fourth Amendment purposes. Bickley, 489 S.E.2d at
170.
121. See Bickley, 489 S.E.2d at 170.
122. 96 A.3d 793, 797-98 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014) (permitting a secondary
investigative use of a DNA profile collected by consent from a person who limited
the scope of its use to clearing himself of suspicion in an earlier investigation).
123. Id.
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in his DNA identification. 1 2 4 Under this reading of King, police can
use a consent form that limits the purpose for collecting biological
samples to a particular investigation and then retain the resulting
DNA profile in underregulated local and state databases for any fu-
ture use. DNA identification becomes like a photograph or finger-
print of a person that police can use without Fourth Amendment
constraint if the collection of the identification information is
lawful. 125
Varriale appears to be grounded on a misrepresentation of the
common law doctrine of consent. Police do not "lawfully" obtain a
person's DNA identification for any additional purpose when con-
sent to the physical intrusion restricts the purpose of the search.126
When police exceed the bounds of consent, the entry into the con-
senter's body becomes invalid, a common law concept akin to tres-
124. Id.
125. See id. at 797 (citing Wilson v. State, 752 A.2d 1250, 1272 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2000)) ("[T]he re-examination of the validly-obtained sample was no more of
a search, for Fourth Amendment purposes, than is the reexamination of validly-
obtained fingerprints."); Wilson, 752 A.2d at 1272 (holding that no Fourth Amend-
ment search is implicated when police use DNA samples "lawfully obtained in the
course of an earlier investigation . . . in the course of a new and unrelated investi-
gation," and comparing lawfully obtained DNA samples to lawfully obtained "pho-
tographs, handwriting exemplars, ballistics tests, etc."); cf Hayes v. Florida, 470
U.S. 811, 814 (1985) (stating that the fingerprinting process's lack of "repeated
harassment" or "probing into private life" does not justify an unwarranted deten-
tion solely for the purpose of fingerprinting); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721,
723-28 (1969) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use in prose-
cution of fingerprints that were obtained during an unlawful detention). Courts
that equate a DNA profile to fingerprints misapprehend two fundamental points:
first, fingerprints impose the practical safeguard of a person knowing that police
have collected his ten-print set of reference fingerprints; and second, unlike un-
derregulated local and state DNA databases, national, state, and local fingerprint
databases usually provide a procedure for a person to challenge the accuracy of
the information stored in the database, and to seek expungement in appropriate
circumstances. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 16.34 (2010) (detailing the procedure for an
individual to change, correct, or update fingerprinting information retained by
the FBI); MD. CODE REGS. 12.15.01.07 (2014) (giving an individual the right to
inspect and challenge the completeness, content, accuracy, and dissemination of
criminal history record information retained by state criminal justice agencies).
Underregulated local and state DNA databases lack these minimal due process
provisions, yet provide a much greater potential for future misuse. See infra Parts 11-
III.
126. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTs § 892A(3) (1979) ("Conditional con-
sent or consent restricted as to time, area or in other respects is effective only
within the limits of the condition or restriction."); see also id. § 168 ("A conditional
or restricted consent to enter land creates a privilege to do so only insofar as the
restriction is complied with."); id. § 168 cmt. b ("A consent to entry for a particular
purpose confers no privilege to be on the land for any other purpose.").
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pass or battery.127 Varriale's rationale illustrates how one court's
view of the free-floating "expectation of privacy" test results in less
personal security than the Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence that is
"tied to common-law trespass."128 A decision that a person cannot
limit the scope of consent to a bodily intrusion is consistent with
one scholar's prediction that King will ultimately result in "less ge-
netic privacy" by condoning a more "expansive use of DNA
sampling."129
Before the explosion of DNA databases, however, some courts
did recognize that a person could reasonably limit consent to a par-
ticular case. In State v. Gerace, a Georgia appellate court did not
permit second uses of a DNA profile derived from a blood sample
acquired by consent.130 In that case, after a traffic accident, law en-
forcement read the defendant his implied consent rights and ob-
tained consent to take a blood sample pursuant to state law, which
allowed law enforcement to test for drugs and alcohol. 13 ' His blood
sample was submitted for DNA testing, which led to his arrest for
rape and aggravated sodomy.13 2 The court recognized that "prior to
receiving the DNA test results, [law enforcement] had no probable
cause to arrest [the defendant] in connection with the rape."133
Looking at the totality of the circumstances, however, the court
held that "' [h]ad [the defendant] been cautioned that the results
of the search and seizure of his blood would be used to supply evi-
dence against him in an independent criminal prosecution, no con-
sent might have been given."" 3 4 The court declined to accept the
state's proposal that, because the blood was obtained with consent,
law enforcement was free to use it for any purpose. 35
In a 1994 decision, the Oregon Court of Appeals read consent
similarly. In State v. Binner, the defendant consented to having his
127. See id.
128. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). See also Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan J., concurring) (explaining the con-
tours of the "expectation of privacy" test); Varriale, 96 A.3d at 796-98.
129. Elizabeth E. Joh, Term Paper, Maryland v. King: Policing and Genetic Pri-
vacy, 11 OHIo ST. J. CIum. L. 281, 294 (2013).
130. 437 S.E.2d 862 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
131. Id. at 862-63.
132. Id. at 862.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 863 (quoting Beasley v. State, 419 S.E.2d 92, 94 (Ga. Ct. App.
1992)).
135. Id. at 862. This result was consistent with an earlier Georgia Supreme
Court holding that evidence obtained by consent cannot be used for purposes
beyond the scope of that consent. Turpin v. Helmeci, 518 S.E.2d 887, 889 (Ga.
1999).
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blood taken for alcohol testing, which returned a result within the
legal limit, but he declined to give a urine sample for drug test-
ing. 136 Without a warrant, his blood sample was then tested for
drugs, and came back positive.137 The court determined that the
defendant had a privacy interest in the contents of his blood and
had expressly limited his consent to a test for alcohol. 38 Thus, by
implication, he did not consent to the drug testing.'39
In a 1970 decision, the Fifth Circuit also read consent similarly.
Graves v. Beto was an appeal from a Texas District Court's grant of a
writ of habeas corpus. 140 After the defendant's arrest for being
drunk in public, police received a report of a rape, and the victim's
description of her assailant resembled the defendant.141 Some
blood was found at the scene of the rape and the chief of police
requested that the defendant consent to a blood draw.142 In making
the request, however, the chief represented that his purpose was
solely to determine the alcohol content of the blood, and the de-
fendant consented to the bodily intrusion for a sample of blood
based on that limitation. 43 The defendant's sample was then ana-
lyzed for blood type and compared to the blood recovered at the
rape crime scene-it matched.144 The evidence, though, was held
to be inadmissible because the consent was based on the chiefs
misrepresentations.14 5 Therefore, the police had only limited au-
thority to test for the presence of alcohol in the blood.146
Consent is a very powerful tool capable of relieving law en-
forcement officers of the burden of obtaining warrants and estab-
lishing probable cause.147 The reasonableness of consent, however,
is debatable considering the fundamentally coercive nature of
many police encounters. 48 Perhaps the more difficult question is
136. 886 P.2d 1056, 1057 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1059.
139. Id.
140. 424 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1970).
141. Id. at 524.
142. Id. at 525.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 524.
145. Id. at 526.
146. Graves v. Beto, 424 F.2d 524, 526 (5th Cir. 1970).
147. Fred W. Drobner, Comment, DNA Dragnets: Constitutional Aspects of Mass
DNA Identification Testing, 28 CAP. U. L. REv. 479, 503 (2000).
148. Id. at 504-05 ("The flat statement by police that a sample would be col-
lected could be considered a claim of lawful authority . .. which would obviate ...
putative consent. The police station setting itself, with large numbers of armed
uniformed officers displaying indicia of authority, as well as the physical isolation
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whether courts will properly apply a settled doctrine like the law of
consent to a new technology that is perceived to be infallible.
E. Uncertainty in the Application of the Doctrine of Consent
When Applied to DNA Collection
Traditionally, in the absence of a valid warrant the "[s]tate as-
sumes the burden of overcoming the presumption of invalidity by
demonstrating . . . that the warrantless search satisfied one of the
firmly established exceptions to the warrant requirement."14 9 When
the government seeks to rely upon consent tojustify the lawfulness
of a search, it has the burden of proving that the consent was, in
fact, freely and voluntarily given.o50 Because a person who consents
to a search "may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of the
search,"15 1 the government must also prove that the search was
within the actual scope of consent.152 The allocation of the burden
of proof means that "'[w]here the evidence is inconclusive. . . the defen-
dant wins.' "153
In the context of DNA analysis, a court must decide between
two basic consent scenarios: first, a nonoffender may have expressly
consented to any future use of his DNA, or in the absence of ex-
press consent, the court may have determined that general consent
to all future uses is implied;154 and second, a nonoffender may have
experienced by the subjects, can also be considered a coercive environment where
an individual does not feel free to refuse a request, whether reasonable or not.").
149. Graham v. State, 807 A.2d 75, 87 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002); see alsoJones
v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 500 (1958).
150. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968); see also United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 222 (1973); Doering v. State, 545 A.2d 1281, 1290 (Md. 1988); Whitman
v. State, 336 A.2d 515, 520 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975).
151. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252 (1991).
152. Graham, 807 A.2d at 88 (holding that a reviewing court must make its
own de novo assessment of "1) the voluntariness of the ostensible consent and 2),
even if voluntary, the actual scope of that consent").
153. Id. at 87 (quoting Duncan v. State, 340 A.2d 722, 725 (1975)).
154. See fimeno, 500 U.S. at 252. The scope of consent-as it relates to genetic
materials-plays an equally important role outside of the criminal justice system.
One of the world's largest private DNA databases, Icelandic-based deCODE Genet-
ics, Inc., wanted to use "genealogical records to estimate the genotypes of close
relatives of its more than 120,000 research volunteers." deCODE Denied, GENOME
WEB (June 21, 2013), http://www.genomeweb.com/blog/decode-denied. Ice-
land's Data Protection Authority required the company to obtain informed con-
sent from all individuals whose genetic material would be used to conduct a
genotype study of 280,000 living and dead relatives. Jocelyn Kaiser, Agency Nixes
deCODE's New Data Mining Plan, 240 SCIENCE 1388, 1388 (2013). deCODE was
founded in 1996 with the specific intention of establishing a "DNA database of the
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expressly limited the scope of a consent search to a particular inves-
tigation or the court may imply such a limit from the circumstances.
Under the traditional analysis, the government bears the burden of
demonstrating either express consent, or that the use of the DNA
was within the scope of implied consent as measured by the stan-
dard of objective reasonableness. 15 5 Objective reasonableness evalu-
ates scope of consent as that which "an ordinary reasonable person
would understand to be the scope of consent between the officer
and the consenting person."1 56
The effectiveness of court regulation of local and state DNA
databases is both uncertain and inconsistent, with perhaps too
much focus on the particular facts of the instant case. For example,
in United States v. Kriesel, a sharply divided panel of the Ninth Cir-
cuit addressed the government's interest in retention of a physical
DNA sample.' 57 After pleading guilty to a drug conspiracy charge,
Edward Kriesel agreed to submit a blood sample for DNA analysis
as a condition of his supervised release. 58 After his DNA profile was
added to CODIS, Kriesel demanded the return of his actual blood
sample, claiming the sample qualified as property. 59 The majority
determined that although a blood sample qualifies as property, the
government has a legitimate interest in retaining it.160
The Ninth Circuit aptly recognized that we live in a "rapidly
changing world in which risks of undue intrusions on privacy are
also changing."' 61 The court stressed "that if scientific discoveries
whole Icelandic population and mining it for genetic markers linked to common
diseases. The company never received legal approval for such a national database.
But more than 140,000 volunteers agreed to allow the company to combine their
medical and DNA information with Iceland's genealogy database." Jocelyn Kaiser,
Purchase by Amgen Won't Affect deCODE Genetics' Research, Founder Says, SCIENCE MAGA-
ZINE (Dec. 12, 2012, 5:05 PM), http://news.sciencemag.org/people-events/2012/
12/purchase-amgen-wont-affect-decode-genetics-research-founder-says. After de-
CODE experienced significant financial difficulties, American company Amgen
purchased deCODE with the intention of leading the industry in its ability to
"identify and validate disease targets in human populations." Turna Ray, With de-
CODE Purchase, Amgen Gains Genetics Expertise, Consumers Lose DTC Testing Option,
PHARMACOGENOMIcs REPORTER (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.genomeweb.com/clin
ical-genomics/decode-purchase-amgen-gains-genetics-expertise-consumers-lose-
dtc-testing-option.
155. See State v. Binner, 886 P.2d 1056, 1059 (Or. 1994).
156. In re Tariq A-R-Y, 701 A.2d 691, 697 (Md. 1997) (Eldridge,J., dissenting)
(citing Wilkerson v. State, 594 A.2d 597 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991)).
157. 720 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2013).
158. Id. at 1139.
159. Id. at 1142.
160. Id. at 1139-40.
161. Id. at 1147.
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make clear that junk DNA reveals more about individuals than . . .
previously understood, [the court] should reconsider the govern-
ment's DNA collection programs."162  It also noted that
"[g]overnment and commercial entities enjoy increasing capacity to
obtain, store, and analyze information about people, giving rise to
increasing concerns about privacy."163
Recognizing that no single law enforcement investigation
method is perfect-even one with "as good a record as CODIS"-
the Kriesel dissent urged that investigative tools are "intended to aid
in investigation, not to supplant it entirely."164 The dissent strongly
urged that "this case deal [t] not just with junk DNA or a CODIS
profile derived from junk DNA, but the retention, for at least the
remainder of an individual's lifetime, of his full genetic code."165 In
essence, the dissent urged that there is no justification for "the re-
tention of the entirety of that individual's, and millions of others',
private genetic information for the rest of their lives." 166 In opposi-
tion to the majority's dismissal of Kriesel's Fourth Amendment ar-
guments, the dissent also observed, "We do not need scientists to
discover anything new to know that a full specimen of an individ-
ual's DNA reveals private information about that individual's pre-
disposition for certain diseases and disorders, paternity and other
familial relationships, and racial ancestry."167
The Kriesel dissent underscores that the retention of a DNA
profile and sample intrudes upon a privacy interest that extends
beyond an interest in not getting caught. A "seized for one, seized
for all" approach to volunteered DNA samples cannot be squared
with the substantial privacy interests at stake. When police indefi-
nitely retain consent samples in a database to search for evidence of
criminality in unrelated cases, they must demonstrate that any con-
162. Id.
163. United States v. Kriesel, 720 F.3d 1137, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013). The dissent
in Kriesel emphasized the distinction between the retention of the DNA sample
and the retention of the DNA profile derived from it. Id. at 1150 (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
164. Id. at 1156 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("Our criminal justice system suc-
cessfully deterred and punished crime for hundreds of years before the use of
DNA evidence became standard practice.").
165. Id. at 1150.
166. Id. at 1153. The Kriesel dissent apparently understood CODIS to require
expungement upon the death of the qualified convictee or arrestee. That is not
necessarily the case. In Maryland, for example, expungement only occurs automat-
ically if no conviction ever occurs, the conviction is reversed or vacated, or an
unconditional pardon is granted. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-511 (West
2009).
167. Kriesel, 720 F.3d at 1157 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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sent to the bodily intrusion was, in fact, freely and voluntarily
given.168 Because a person who consents to a search "may of course
delimit as he chooses the scope of the search," the police must also
prove that the search was within the actual scope of consent. 169
Does that mean the police must give advice to the target of a con-
sent search that is in his best interest? The Supreme Court has
clearly stated that police do not have to tell a person that he can
decline to consent.170
At the same time, courts should not tolerate incomplete or gar-
bled explanations in response to a nonoffender's questions about
the implication of consenting to the collection of a DNA sample to
aid in an investigation. Courts are unlikely to apply the principles of
informed consent to DNA collection, although it remains the cur-
rent standard of consent outside of the field of criminal justice.17 1
As noted by the UK Human Genetics Commission, "'the difficulties
involved in tracing and securing re-consent for different forms of
medical research may make obtaining fresh consent impractical
and would seriously limit the usefulness of large-scale population
databases.'I 72 Genetic material used in medical research focuses
on consent laws that "provid [e] research participants with relevant
information in order to allow autonomous decision-making." 173
Failure to provide accurate and complete information to individu-
als violates the "ethical principles that underlie much consent juris-
prudence."*74 Collecting and storing DNA samples en masse creates
the possible threat of myriad "social and ethical concerns, including
168. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968); see also United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
169. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252 (1991).
170. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222.
171. Timothy Caulfield et al., DNA Databanks and Consent: A Suggested Policy
Option Involving an Authorization Model, BMC MED. ETHICS, Jan 3, 2003, at 1. At the
time of publication, only one state required informed consent for DNA samples
volunteered to a statewide database. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 1285.40 (2012)
("Individuals may voluntarily provide samples for the Convicted Offender DNA
database if they sign the informed consent section of the sample collection receipt
contained in the collection kit, or by signing a separate consent form provided or
approved by the Department of State Police. The voluntary sample will be used for
criminal investigations by comparing the DNA profile from the individual with
other DNA profiles in the database.").
172. Caulfield, supra note 171, at 2 (quoting HUMAN GENETICS COMM'N, IN-
SIDE INFORMATION: BALANCING INTERESTS IN THE USE OF PERSONAL GENETIC DATA 94
(2002)).
173. Id.
174. Id.
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possible genetic discrimination." 7 5 No reasonable person would
consent to relinquishing his genetic material for any future use ab-
sent informed consent.
II.
SLEEPER CELLS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL
DNA DATABASES
In spite of the threat to individual privacy, law enforcement
officials trumpet the value of local DNA databases as an effective
crime-solving tool.1 76 Local DNA databases "operate under their
own rules," and as a result, they can catalogue a far greater number
of DNA samples than their state and federal counterparts.17 7 Laws
regulating local DNA databases exist in a very small number of
states. 78 . Even among the limited laws regulating local DNA
databases, there is "little consensus about what DNA retention poli-
cies are appropriate at the local level."' 79 Without strict rules gov-
erning local DNA databases, local law enforcement agencies are
able to exercise great discretion in the collection and use of DNA
samples.'80 According to experts, with technological advances al-
lowing for "rapid DNA testing," local DNA databases will continue
to expand.' 8 '
A. "More is Better": Familial Searching and DNA Dragnets
The success of CODIS in generating investigatory leads from
offender profiles stored in the national databank incentivizes police
to expand state and local DNA databases to include more
profiles.' 82 Commentators have noted the opportunity for police to
create "offline" DNA databases that are not connected to CODIS to
target the "usual suspects" who are defined by demographics like
race, class, and geographic location.' 85 However, police are ex-
panding state and local DNA databases that are connected to
CODIS in ways that were probably never legislatively intended. Po-
175. Id. at 2-3.
176. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 14.
177. Id.
178. Id. ("Alaska prohibits them. California and Hawaii are explicit in not
precluding them. In many states, including New York, the law is silent on the
issue.").
179. Id.
180. See id.
181. Id.
182. SeeJoh, supra note 129, at 287.
183. E.g., id. at 286.
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lice have discovered the backdoor to CODIS: federal law limits the
DNA profiles that can be stored in the national databank, but these
limits do not extend to state and local DNA databases.184
At the national level, DNA samples must adhere to federal re-
quirements (including the offense and laboratory processing stan-
dards) before qualifying for inclusion in CODIS.18 5 While many
states have also adopted requisite standards for their own statewide
DNA databases, some local police departments have established
their own databases with little or no regulation. 86 In recent years,
"a growing number of law enforcement agencies collect DNA for
their own 'offline' databases."' 87 Out of either frustration with the
inefficiencies of state DNA laboratories or a desire to utilize DNA
samples ineligible for collection under state or federal law, many
local law enforcement agencies view local DNA databases "as valua-
ble investigative tools."18 8 Rather than limiting collection of DNA
samples to convicted offenders and arrestees, many local law en-
forcement agencies also collect samples from "volunteers, victims,
and suspects."' 89 Innocent crime victims may "not necessarily real-
ize their DNA will be saved for future searches."190 Such collections
are "profoundly disturbing" because DNA voluntarily given to the
police to clear a name can be retained and used in the investigation
of future crimes. 91
Because of guidelines governing which samples are eligible for
submission to the national databank, not all DNA profiles that are
entered at the local and state levels will wind up being included at
184. See 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a) (2012) ("The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation may establish an index of-(1) DNA identification records of-(A)
persons convicted of crimes; (B) persons who have been charged in an indictment
or information with a crime; and (C) other persons whose DNA samples are col-
lected under applicable legal authorities, provided that DNA samples that are vol-
untarily submitted solely for elimination purposes shall not be included in the
National DNA Index System; (2) analyses of DNA samples recovered from crime
scenes; (3) analyses of DNA samples recovered from unidentified human remains;
and (4) analyses of DNA samples voluntarily contributed from relatives of missing
persons."); see also supra note 13 and accompanying text. Note that federal law
firmly requires that "DNA samples that are voluntarily submitted solely for elimina-
tion purposes shall not be included in the National DNA Index System."
§ 14132 (a) (1) (C).
185. Joh, supra note 129, at 286.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Goldstein, supra note 14.
191. Id.
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the national databank.192 Local laboratories are free to decide what
sorts of profiles can be stored only in the local database without
running afoul of an inspection review, because these periodic in-
spections focus exclusively on samples that have been uploaded to
the national databank.19 3 In general, local databases warehouse two
main types of samples: reference samples from known individuals
and unknown crime scene samples.194 While some local labs are
proactive in their use of local databases, there are many that limit
their own profiles to those that are permissible at the national
level.195 Those labs that are proactive in this regard-that is, those
that include more legally obtained samples in the local database
than may ultimately be submitted to the national databank-claim
they are providing a more valuable service to their communities be-
cause they are likely to provide more investigative leads through
CODIS.19 6
For example, during the course of the typical investigation, po-
lice will frequently collect many investigative reference samples.19 7
Even if some of these samples are not eligible for entry into the
national databank, some localities are allowed to keep the DNA
profiles in their own local databases.' 98 In addition, securing sam-
ples from otherwise ineligible defendants through plea bargains
provides additional opportunities to solve crimes through
CODIS.o99 Because criminals often commit crimes repeatedly in the
same geographic area, local law enforcement is able to make the
case for these local databases.2 00 Little concern is expressed over
the potential for gerrymandering the contours of a geographic area
192. Rockne Harmon, The Power of LDIS, FORENSIC MAGAZINE (Apr. 16, 2013,
4:38 PM), http://www.forensicmag.com/articles/2013/04/power-ldis.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. CODIS has a 30% success rate, but forensic experts hypothesize that
the use of local databases can "drive that success rate even higher" and "make our
communities safer." Id.
197. Id.
198. Harmon, supra note 192.
199. Id.
200. Id. ("[D]ata released from the FBI indicates that in more than 87% of
the offender hits in the database, the crime took place in the same state in which
the offender provided a DNA sample. That follows the trend that police officers
have seen for ages: criminals tend to offend locally, working the same area over
and over-and, indeed, experience demonstrates that the offender may be con-
victed repeatedly in the same jurisdiction. Because of this behavior, having a geo-
graphically focused local database gives law enforcement agents an effective tool
for solving crimes in their communities.").
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to follow lines of race or class, the pooling of data between labora-
tories, the enhanced "CODIS-plus" profiles that include informa-
tion necessary to identify a male's paternal line, or the cynicism of
bartering for a young male's DNA that will permanently put him-
and effectively his family-in a database with uncertain opportuni-
ties to expunge his genetic information.
Orange County, California, serves as a prime example of a city
using a local DNA database on steroids. Law enforcement claims
more is better, but is it? The Orange County local database has
reached 80,000 offender profiles and shares information with
neighboring jurisdictions.201 Local officials tout a recently solved
kidnapping and rape case from 2001 as an example of the
database's effectiveness. 2 0 2 In 2012, a man was arrested for driving
under the influence. 203 When his DNA sample was submitted to the
local database following his conviction, it matched the DNA evi-
dence collected from a 2001 crime scene, which was housed in the
county lab. 204 Proponents, citing this example, argue that solving
even one case justifies the expansion of underregulated local DNA
databases at any cost.20 5 But without greater transparency, it is not
possible to determine whether data like this is being cherry picked.
The lack of transparency in the demographics of the persons in the
database and self-selected data about matches should make one
skeptical of extraordinary claims of effectiveness. 206
Underregulated DNA databases are also used to perform
searches of familial DNA, a practice that the FBI does not routinely
permit at the federal level.207 In fact, a handful of states openly
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Harmon, supra note 192.
205. Cf id. ("'This is exactly the type of crime we were targeting when we
created the Orange County District Attorney's local DNA database. I am confident
that many violent, serious crimes such as this will be solved as more samples from
local offenders are entered into the database,' said Tony Rackauckas, District At-
torney, in a statement on behalf of Orange County.").
206. See id.
207. See Familial Searching, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-
analysis/codis/familial-searching (last visited Nov. 30, 2013) (" [F]amilial searching
is not currently performed at the National DNA Index System."). "Familial search-
ing" is a technique that relies on the similarities of DNA profile data between re-
lated persons to search for partial matches between crime scene evidence and
profiles of known individuals in a database. Id. The partial matches may identify
family members of the unknown individual from whom the reference DNA sample
was collected at the crime scene. Id. In this way, the offender in the database func-
tions as a "genetic beacon" that may point the way to family members as potential
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practice familial DNA searches, while other states are silent or ex-
plicitly prohibit such use.208 As of June 2011, California, Colorado,
Texas, and Virginia are known to perform these familial
searches. 209 Other states like Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Tennes-
see have contemplated legislation pushing toward using familial
DNA searches.210 Whereas Maryland and the District of Columbia
have explicitly prohibited such usage,211 other jurisdictions have
simply started employing familial searching based upon existing
laboratory policies.212 Local databases are a growing phenomenon,
with little to no guidance and regulations as to search practices;
local law enforcement agencies are governing themselves and creat-
ing in-house policies regarding DNA collection and sample
usage. 213
The scope of the problem is magnified when the casework of a
local DNA laboratory intersects-as it often does-with DNA drag-
nets to identify the source of DNA collected at a crime scene. 214
When there is no hit of the unknown suspect profile to any of-
fender profile in the national DNA databank, police may utilize a
DNA dragnet-requesting DNA swabs from a target population
that may largely be defined by economic class, race, or sex-to ex-
pand the collection of DNA to a selected group of individuals who
are "associated" with the crime. 215 When these mass screenings of
DNA sampling take place, typically the police have no particular-
suspects. Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from Probable Bonds: A Genetic Tattle Tale
Based on Familial DNA, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 3, 18 (2010).
208. Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches ofDNA Databases, 109 Mich.
L. Rev. 291, 302 (2010).
209. Familial Searching, supra note 207.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See Goldstein, supra note 14.
214. Phillip Pan, Pr. George's Chief Has Used Serial Testing Before; Farrell Oversaw
DNA Sampling of 2,300 in Ha., WASH. PosT, Jan. 31, 1998, at BI (reporting on new
Prince George's County Police Chief's use of "serial DNA testing" in a high-profile
rape and murder case).
215. See Richard Willing, Privacy Issue Is the Catch for Police DNA 'Dragnets, 'USA
TODAY, Sept. 16, 1998, at Al. The DNA samples are collected from the "group" en
masse and without a warrant. Id. The first known DNA dragnet consisted of 4500
men in the English village of Narborough in 1986. Angus J. Dodson, Comment,
DNA "Line-Ups" Based on a Reasonable Suspicion Standard, 71 U. COLo. L. REv. 221,
223-24 (2000). Furthermore, the term "associated" is often used very loosely. For
example, in the Narborough dragnet, the men sampled were "associated" with a
rape of two teenage girls simply because each subject lived in the same town as the
victims. See Sepideh Esmaili, Note, Searching for a Needle in a Haystack: The Constitu-
tionality of Police DNA Dragnets, 82 CHI.-KEr L. REv. 495, 499-500 (2007).
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ized suspicion of any individual and focus the dragnet on those who
may have had access to the crime scene, were in the vicinity, were of
the same race as the perpetrator, or simply knew the victim. 2 1 6 In a
dragnet situation, police lack probable cause to obtain a search war-
rant of any one individual in the group and therefore need consent
to collect a DNA sample from the target.217 Usually, individual
targets in the group are excluded as suspects through DNA test-
ing.2 1 8 Conversely, when any individual target refuses consent, he
comes under the heightened suspicion of police who may try to
obtain a search warrant or surreptitiously collect a DNA sample.219
And while these voluntarily submitted samples cannot be uploaded
to the national DNA databank,220 police maintain that they may
upload the profiles into local and state DNA databases that partici-
pate in CODIS to search for evidence connecting the person to
other crimes beyond the purview of the dragnet. 221
A major concern is that the profiles of the individuals excluded
as the source of any crime scene evidence may be permanently re-
tained in the local and state databases because these casework
profiles are treated as evidence.222 A Louisiana case provides a
216. See, e.g., Corbin v. State, 52 A.3d 946, 957 (Md. 2012) (stating that the
police collected DNA samples from nine to twelve men who were deemed "associ-
ates of the victim"); see also Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753, 755 (Md. 2014) ("The
victim contacted the police on numerous occasions throughout the next two years
to inform them about potential suspects. During that time, the police obtained
consensual DNA samples from approximately 20 individuals with possible connec-
tions to the 2006 rape, including several of the victim's neighbors. None of those
DNA samples matched the DNA collected from the victim's home on the day of
the rape.").
217. See Willing, supra note 215.
218. See Grand, supra note 37, at 2283-84.
219. Id. & n.31. Often, this is the goal of conducting the dragnet. Id. at
2278-79.
220. See FBI, NDIS OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 13, § 4.2.1.
Although a DNA profile from a known person cannot be uploaded to the offender
index unless collected pursuant to applicable state law, a state or local laboratory
(like those in Maryland) that defines casework profiles from known persons as
forensic samples may be able to exploit a regulatory exception that permits man-
ual searches of forensic samples in the national DNA databank if exigent circum-
stances exist. See id. § 5.3.
221. See Grand, supra note 37, at 2279-80, 2283 & n.28.
222. Some courts have already refused to grant expungement requests from
individuals who have been excluded as suspects in a criminal investigation. See, e.g.,
Varriale v. State, 96 A.3d 793, 799 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014) ("While it may seem
anomalous that a volunteer like Varriale would have fewer statutory protections
than someone who had been charged with or even convicted of a serious criminal
offense, the anomaly is a result of the history and structure of the DNA Collection
Act itself. When it was initially enacted in 1994, the Act authorized the collection,
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prime example of the use of DNA dragnets and local DNA
databases. Law enforcement in southern Louisiana launched an ex-
tensive manhunt for a serial killer who raped and murdered three
women.223 After recovering DNA evidence from the crime scenes,
law enforcement attributed the murders to the same unknown male
perpetrator.224 In an effort to track down the killer, local and state
law enforcement joined forces with the FBI to launch a task force
"to generate leads on the serial killer's identity."2 25 Two anonymous
tips lead investigators to Shannon Kohler.226 Although Kohler ini-
tially appeared willing to voluntarily provide law enforcement with a
DNA sample, media reports caused him to refuse further coopera-
tion.227 Convinced of Kohler's involvement, law enforcement ob-
tained a warrant and Kohler ultimately submitted to a cheek
swab.228 After law enforcement filed the warrant in the public
records, local media quickly targeted Kohler "as a suspect in the
serial killer investigation who was refusing to cooperate with po-
lice."229 Kohler did not learn that his DNA was not a match to the
killer until reading a local newspaper two months later.230 After
learning that he was no longer a suspect, Kohler requested the ex-
pungement of his DNA profile from "any place where it had been
stored," including local databases. 231 The Fifth Circuit did not rule
on whether Kohler's could seek expungement, and to date it is un-
retention, and (in some cases) expungement of DNA only from persons who had
been convicted of felonies or of other enumerated crimes. In 2008, the General
Assembly amended the Act to extend its provisions, including the expungement
provisions, to persons who had been charged with a crime of violence, an attempt
to commit a crime of violence, burglary, or an attempt to commit a burglary. The
General Assembly, however, has yet to extend the expungement provisions to per-
sons like Varriale, who voluntarily consent to the taking of a DNA sample.") (cita-
tions omitted); Amato v. Dist. Att'y for the Cape and Islands Dist., 952 N.E.2d 400,
410 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (holding that law enforcement's refusal to expunge an
elimination profile in a database derived from a DNA sample voluntarily provided
to police during a homicide investigation constitutes "unreasonable, substantial,
and serious interference with privacy" under state statute restricting extraneous
collection and storage of information by governmental units).
223. Kohler v. Englade, 470 F.3d 1104, 1106 (5th Cir. 2006).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1107.
226. Id.
227. Id. For example, media reports indicated that the killer wore a size ten
or eleven shoe, whereas Kohler told law enforcement he wore a size thirteen or
fourteen shoe. Id.
228. Id.
229. Kohler v. Englade, 470 F.3d 1104, 1107 (5th Cir. 2006).
230. Id. at 1107-08.
231. Id. at 1108.
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clear whether his DNA profile remains in a state or local
database.232
B. "More is Better": Low Quality Crime Scene DNA
The underregulation of state and local DNA databases also
means that low-quality DNA profiles developed from crime scene
samples that cannot be uploaded to the national DNA databank are
placed in state and local databases.233 The risk of misidentification
increases when degraded, partial, or irrelevant crime scene profiles
are stored in databases. 234 DNA analysis of low amounts of DNA,
called "low-copy number DNA," often fails to detect a complete pro-
file and can add erroneous information.235 In addition, state and
local DNA databases are now being expanded to include other
poor-quality DNA samples like "touch" DNA, driven by the increas-
ing sensitivity of DNA analysis and an insatiable demand for DNA
testing in a wide array of cases from property and drug crimes to
quality-of-life offenses. 236
232. Although the Kohler decision did not resolve Kohler's request for ex-
pungement, it does emphasize the need for thorough judicial scrutiny of decisions
to obtain DNA samples from those suspected of, but not convicted of, committing
a serious crime, and the constitutional requirement that these decisions satisfy the
probable cause standard. See id. at 1109-12. Kohler also recognized that the intru-
siveness of the search extends beyond the collection of a saliva sample to include
an assessment of the analysis and storage of the sample. Id. at 1109 n.4 (noting that
for Fourth Amendment purposes, a chemical analysis of lawfully obtained blood,
breath, and urine samples, as well as the collection, analysis and storage of blood
and saliva, constitutes a search).
233. See, e.g., William C. Thompson, Forensic DNA Evidence: The Myth of Infalli-
bility, in GENETIC EXPLANATIONS: SENSE AND NONSENSE 227 (Sheldon Krimsky &
Jeremy Gruber, eds., 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2214379.
234. See BUTLER, supra note 17, at 526; GILL, supra note 27, at 125 ("Random
match probabilities are more likely with low-template DNA profiles that are multi-
contributor mixes.").
235. See Peter Gill, Application of Low Copy Number DNA Profiling, 42 Croatian
Med. J. 229 (2001); Carole McCartney, LCD DNA: Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt?, 9
NATURE REVIEWs GENETICs 325 (May 2008).
236. See Thompson, supra note 233, at 232 (discussing how a "touch" DNA
sample in a DNA database falsely implicated a California man in a rape case); see
also John Butler, Nat'l Inst. of Standards & Tech., Presentation at the National
Institute ofJustice Conference: What We Have Learned (June 20, 2012), available
at http://www.cstl.nist.gov/div831/strbase/mixture/NIJ2012-WhatLearned-Butler
.pdf (recognizing the variation in how analysts in crime laboratories interpret com-
plex mixtures); Charlotte J. Word, Mixture Interpretation: Why Is It Sometimes So
Hard?, PROMEGA (2011), http://www.promega.com/resources/profiles-in-dna/
2011/mixture-interpretation-why-is-it-sometimes-so-hard/ (explaining the chal-
lenges of interpreting multi-source DNA mixtures).
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The number of partial crime scene profiles that matched mul-
tiple persons in Great Britian's national DNA databank illustrates
the scope of the concern. Between May 2001 and September 2006,
182,612 crime scene profiles were matched.237 A single suspect was
reported for 132,178 of these match groups; for the remainder of
matches (nearly 50,000), a list of potential suspects was pro-
duced.238 In its annual report, the agency overseeing the database
explained that " [t]he identification of more than one potential sus-
pect as the source of the DNA at some scenes is largely due to the
significant proportion of crime scene sample profiles that are
partial."239
The existence of a database that contains low-quality DNA
profiles developed from crime scene samples means that individu-
als whose profiles are contained in the database, and their family
members, may be falsely connected to criminal investigations. 24 0
Whereas FBI regulations exclude these poor-quality samples from
the U.S. national databank in an attempt to ensure the quality of
investigative leads generated from a "hit" to an individual in the
convicted offender or arrestee indices, many state and local
237. NAT'L DNA DATABASE STRATEGY BD., supra note 27.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See Thompson, supra note 233, at 232; SHELDON KRIMSKY & TANIA
SIMONCELLI, GENETIC JUSTICE: DNA DATA BANKS, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS AND
CIvIL LIBERTIES 300-04 (2011) (discussing the myth of objectivity in DNA interpre-
tation and the myth that a mismatch between DNA profiles excludes a person from
suspicion). For example, in a Sacramento, California rape case, a DNA analyst
tested a swab of the victim's breast and identified a male DNA profile. See M.S.
Enkoji, DNA Lapse Puts Scrutiny on Lab Work, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 14, 2006, at
Bl. The profile did not meet the criteria for upload to the national DNA databank,
but was included in the state DNA database. Id. It hit to the profile of a man who
lived in the Sacramento area. Id. However, a subsequent police investigation cast
doubt on the man's involvement in the crime. Id. A supervisor in the crime labora-
tory checked the analyst's interpretation and discovered the analyst made an incor-
rect assumption about the number of male contributors to the low level mixture of
DNA recovered from the victim's breast swab that caused the false hit. Id.
Another recent example of low-level mixtures of recovered DNA comes from
the highly publicized Amanda Knox trial. Renowned forensic expert Greg
Hampikian of Boise State University has advocated for Knox's innocence based on
DNA evidence. Eulonda Sklyes, The Role ofAlleged Trade Secret Forensic Evidence in the
Amanda Knox Murder Case, ORRICK TRADE SECRETS WATCH BLOG (Nov. 8, 2013),
http://blogs.orrick.com/trade-secrets-watch/2013/11/08/the-role-of-alleged-
trade-secret-forensic-evidence-in-the-amanda-knox-murder-case/. He claims the
DNA evidence used at trial was contaminated through the "'casual transfer' of
DNA evidence from one object to another." Id. The details of Hampikian's specific
arguments remain unknown based on Boise State University's allegations that his
arguments and research are protected trade secrets. Id.
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databases may include them.2 4 1 Furthermore, while the FBI audits
the profiles that local and state laboratories upload to the national
databank to further ensure the quality of its investigative leads and
ensure compliance with its upload standards, these audits do not
extend to profiles contained in the local and state laboratories. 2 4 2
When there is uncertainty about the number of contributors to
a crime scene DNA sample and whether all of the data is complete,
a forensic analyst's interpretation of the data to identify profiles of
the contributors becomes prone to subjective assessments, bias, and
error. In a 2011 study, seventeen qualified DNA analysts from ac-
credited crime laboratories were asked to evaluate DNA data that
had actually been used to prove a Georgia man guilty of participat-
ing in a gang rape.2 4 3 The analysts were provided with the scientific
data necessary to interpret the results, but they were not provided
with any contextual information about the facts of the case.2 4 4
Twelve of the analysts concluded that the DNA profile of the Geor-
gia man excluded him as a possible contributor, four found the
data to be uninterpretable, and only one found that he was a con-
tributor to the forensic mixture of DNA. 2 4 5 The wide variation of
results "demonstrates that DNA mixture interpretation has subjec-
tive elements and may be susceptible to bias and other contextual
influences."24 6
C. "More is Better": Turning to the Private Sector
The lack of effective regulation for CODIS-affiliated local DNA
databases also encourages police to obtain DNA database software
in the private market. The Local DNA Index System (LODIS) is
one example of such software. It functions "to bring forensic DNA
technology down to the average city or county level."247 The Palm
241. FBI, NDIS OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 13, § 4.2.1.3;
see also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
242. See FBI, THE FBI QUALITY ASSURANCE STANDARDS AUDIT FOR FORENSIC
DNA LABORATORIES (2011), available at http://www.ncdoj.gov/getdoc/95b5346d-
dfa0-4bca-b423-lel86811895e/2012-NC-DNA-Database-Audit.aspx (describing the
scope of the audits as the scope necessary to establish quality assurance require-
ments for samples included in CODIS).
243. Itiel E. Dror & Greg Hampikian, Subjectivity and Bias in Forensic DNA Mix-
ture Interpretation, 51 Sci. & JUST. 204, 205 (2011).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Bill Berger et al., LODIS, A New Investigative Tool: DNA is Not just Court
Evidence Anymore, THE POLICE CHIEF (April 2008), http://www.policechiefmagazine
.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display-arch&article-id=1465&issue-id=420
08.
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Bay Police Department in Florida deployed LODIS in three sepa-
rate phases. 24 8 The first phase, completed in November 2007, "had
as its primary goal the training of patrol officers in DNA collec-
tion."249 Police officers were "encouraged to collect samples at all
crime scenes."25 0 The second phase of the project allowed officers
to "review DNA test results from a car computer over an encrypted,
secure network."25 1 Phase three culminated in the analysis of the
"overall results in impact on crime" in order to "determine if the
process is affordable for the average agency."252
"LODIS was designed specifically to provide local agencies with
a system to create local DNA databases, which are flexible to meet
the unique investigative needs of local law enforcement agen-
cies." 253 Ultimately, local agencies benefit from LODIS by being
able to "deploy CODIS at their agencies [ ] to be used in conjunc-
tion with other investigative techniques on more commonly com-
mitted crimes."25 4 "As such, it provides an approach for
implementing the local DNA index system (LDIS) component of
CODIS on a broad scale and independent of any limitations in
DNA testing capacity at the state laboratory level." 255
D. Maryland as a Case Example
Maryland is home to two separate levels of underregulated
DNA databases. First, each of the five local police agencies in the
state maintains its own underregulated database.25 6 These local po-
lice agencies operate DNA laboratories and upload profiles to
CODIS.2 57 Each LDIS retains DNA samples from known individuals
that are not eligible to be uploaded to the state or national DNA
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Berger et al., supra note 247.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See History of Maryland's DNA Database, MD. GOVERNOR'S OFF. CRIME CON-
TROL & PREVENTION, http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/dna/maryland-database
.php (last visited Dc. 3, 2014); see also DEP'T OF MD. STATE POLICE, 2011 ANNUAL
REPORT: MARYLAND STATE POLICE FORENSIc SCIENCES DMisION STATEWIDE DNA
DATABASE REPORT (2012). Those agencies are the police departments in Montgom-
ery County, Prince George's County, Baltimore County, Baltimore City, and Anne
Arundel County. Id.
257. Id.
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databank.258 The second level involves the "suspect" index within
the Maryland State DNA database. The suspect index includes DNA
samples collected pursuant to a search warrant from known individ-
uals who are not already catalogued as arrestees or convicted of-
fenders.259 These suspect samples are not eligible for inclusion in
the national DNA databank. 260 The suspect index also includes
DNA samples collected from any individual that the police, at one
time, labeled a "suspect"-even if the DNA evidence cleared the
person of suspicion. 261 The Maryland DNA Databank Act does not
authorize the "suspect" index and the Maryland State Police have
issued no governing regulations, other than to define suspect DNA
as crime scene DNA. 2 6 2 Casework evidence samples are also in-
cluded within the definition of crime scene evidence. 263
By defining the suspect index and casework evidence samples
as crime scene evidence, the genetic privacy of crime victims, indi-
viduals who volunteer DNA samples to aid an investigation, and
persons who provide a DNA sample to clear themselves of any suspi-
cions-whether by consent or pursuant to a warrant-is intruded
upon to a far greater degree than the privacy interest of convicted
offenders and persons arrested for serious crimes; even convicted
offenders and persons arrested for serious crimes are able to enjoy
the statutory protections contained within the Maryland DNA Col-
lection Act.2 6 4 Important safeguards provided by the Maryland
DNA Collection Act include:
258. See, e.g., Varriale v. State, 96 A.3d 793, 795-96 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014)
(recounting how Varriale had been cleared of suspicion by the Anne Arundel
County Police Department during a prior investigation in which his DNA had been
sampled, but that his DNA profile was uploaded into the "suspect index" anyway);
supra note 8 and accompanying text.
259. See id.
260. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 258.
262. See MD. CODE REGS. 29.05.01.01(B) (17) (2012). In 2011, the Maryland
Department of State Police submitted 1901 crime scene DNA evidence samples
that "qualified for inclusion . . . in the Statewide DNA database." OFF. OF LEG.
AUDITS, MD. GEN. ASSEMB., CRIME SCENE DNA COLECTION AND ANALYSIS REPORT-
ING By LAw ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 2 (2013).
263. See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-501(i) (3) (West 2013); MD. CODE
REGS. 29.05.01.01 (B) (17) (2014). DNA samples collected from persons other than
qualifying convictees or offenders-that is, persons who have not been arrested-
are treated as a "forensic or evidence sample." MD. CODE REGS. 29.05.01.01 (B) (17)
(2014). A "forensic or evidence sample" means DNA obtained "from an item of
evidence or an individual, including suspect samples, other than one required to be
collected pursuant to [MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-501 et seq.]." Id. (emphasis
added). For Maryland's definition of "DNA Sample," see § 2-501(i).
264. See §§ 2-501 to 2-514.
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* Limitations on whose profiles are to be included in the
database; 265
* Restrictions on the use of DNA samples included in the
database; 266
* Limitations on whether the state DNA database may be used
to conduct familial searches; 267
* Reporting requirements to the legislature regarding the util-
ity of the database and the racial demographics of the per-
sons in the database;268 and
265. Id. In 1994, when the Maryland General Assembly established a state
database of DNA profiles, it required DNA collection and analysis from individuals
convicted of rape and other sexual offenses. See 1994 Md. Laws 2187. In 1999 and
2002, the General Assembly expanded the Act to cover individuals convicted of all
felonies and some misdemeanors. See 2002 Md. Laws 3716; 1999 Md. Laws 2997. In
2008, the General Assembly temporarily expanded the Act to cover individuals
who had been charged with, but not yet convicted of, crimes of violence and bur-
glaries. § 2-504(a) (3); 2008 Md. Laws 3232. Under the current version of the Act,
the collection of DNA samples from covered individuals is mandatory; with regard
to individuals who have been charged but not convicted, the Act provides that the
state is to collect the sample at the time of the charge. § 2-504(b) (1). In 2013, the
General Assembly removed the Act's sunset provision. See H.B. 292, 433rd Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013).
266. § 2-505(b) (2). The Act further provides that, "(t]o the extent fiscal re-
sources are available," DNA samples "shall be . . . tested" for several purposes,
including "as part of an official investigation into a crime," "to analyze and type the
genetic markers contained in or derived from the [samples]," and "for research
and administrative purposes," such as "develop[ing] a population database after
personal identifying information is removed" and "support[ing] identification re-
search and protocol development of forensic DNA analysis methods." Id. § 2-
505(a). In aid of those purposes, the Act specifically authorizes the state to prepare
and store "DNA records" (the Act's term for DNA profiles), which can be com-
pared with similar profiles in national and state databases. Id. §§ 2-502(d), 2-
504(d)(1), 2-505(b), 2-506(a).
267. Id. § 2-506(d) (prohibiting familial searches of the state DNA database).
The Director of the statewide DNA database has expressly limited the ban on fa-
milial searching to DNA samples from arrestee and convicted offenders: "The
Statewide DNA Data Base System may not be used for the purpose of identification
of an offender in connection with a crime for which the offender may be a biologi-
cal relative of the individual from whom the DNA arrestee or convicted offender sample
was acquired." MD. CODE. REcs. 29.05.01.06(B) (2014) (emphasis added).
268. § 2-513. The reporting requirement is intended to gather data on
whether the disproportionate representation of African Americans in the criminal
justice system translates into African Americans also being disproportionately rep-
resented in governmental DNA databases. See § 2-513(b) (3); MD. GEN. ASSEMB.
DEP'T OF LEGAL SERVS., THE 90 DAY REPORT: A REVIEW OF THE 2008 LEGISLATIVE
SESSION, Gen. Assemb. 425, 2008 Sess., at E-14 (2008). In the first three years since
Maryland has begun collecting data about racial demographics of arrestees from
whom DNA samples were seized, minorities have consistently represented approxi-
mately 60% of the total number of individuals subject to the compelled collection
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* Most importantly, expungement provisions.269
As discussed in Part III, the underregulated local and state in-
dices in Maryland represent a substantial privacy intrusion upon in-
dividuals who have not (1) engaged in conduct that lessens their
expectation of privacy, or (2) consented to the indefinite retention
of their DNA in a law enforcement database that does not even of-
fer the protections afforded convicted offenders or arrestees.
Although many states are following the Maryland trend, some
jurisdictions are taking a closer look at the local use of DNA
databases in response to King.270 An Alabama official, for example,
suggested that local law enforcement agencies should not have
their own laboratories out of a concern over bias and insufficient
resources.27 1 The Montgomery Police Department collects DNA evi-
dence, but must send samples to the Alabama Department of Fo-
rensic Sciences for analysis. 272 However, two Alabama counties
collected voluntarily given blood and mouth swab samples at road-
blocks to survey for the presence of alcohol and drugs in the driv-
ers' samples.273 Officials neglected to disclose whether or not the
samples would be retained following the study.274
of DNA merely upon being charged. See DEP'T OF MD. STATE POLICE, supra note
256, at 7-8.
269. MD. CODE REGs. 29.05.01.14(J) (2012) ("If an individual whose DNA
sample is in the Statewide DNA Database System for a reason other than as a sam-
ple collected from an arrestee, any additional sample shall remain in the database
and is not subject to automatic expungement."). As to individuals who have been
charged and arraigned but not yet convicted, the Act authorizes the state to store
both DNA samples and DNA profiles while charges remain pending. §§ 2-506(b),
2-511. If a charge results in a conviction, the DNA sample and DNA profile are
retained indefinitely; if the charge does not result in a conviction (or the convic-
tion is later overturned), the state is required to destroy the DNA sample and ex-
punge the DNA profile from its database. Id. § 2-511(a)(1), (c).
270. See Erin Edgemon, Law Enforcement Agencies Across Country Amassing DNA
Databases, Some Alabama Police Collect DNA, But Don't Keep It, AL.com BLOG (updated
June 14, 2013, 12:24 PM), http://blog.al.com/montgomery/2013/06/?awen
forcement-agencies-acros.html.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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III.
SLIPPING THROUGH THE CRACKS: ADVANCES IN
TECHNOLOGY AMPLIFY LONG-STANDING DIVISIONS IN
SOCIETY BETWEEN GROUPS LARGELY DEFINED
BY RACE AND CLASS
The ease of collection, swift processing, and low cost, com-
bined with the opportunity to indefinitely retain DNA samples in
underregulated local or state DNA databases, creates a powerful in-
centive for police to target disfavored individuals for DNA collec-
tion. Courts have mostly been unwilling to scrutinize unwarranted
search claims arising out of collection from persons who consent to
a buccal swab, finding that consent constitutes a waiver of any pri-
vacy interest in DNA identification.2 75 And, the lack of transparency
shields underregulated databases from any meaningful legislative
oversight on the utility or disproportionate impact of police collec-
tion practices.
As technology advances, lawyers, judges, and lawmakers strug-
gle to deal with the associated changes.276 The gap between the
technology and the law often leads to scenarios that "can poten-
tially conflict with existing social . .. and cultural values."2 7 7 Legisla-
tive checks and balances are designed to ensure that laws are a
reflection of discourse and debate-they safeguard against reac-
tionary legislation. Emerging technologies do not yet have those
safeguards. Once new technology is introduced to the market, the
legislature must still follow its lawmaking processes. The rapid pace
at which new technologies are created and integrated into society
means that even newly enacted legislation may not truly reflect what
275. See, e.g., Garcia-Torres v. State, 949 N.E.2d 1229, 1237-39 (Ind. 2011)
(holding that there had been no Fourth Amendment violation because the defen-
dant had voluntary consented to the buccal swab); Pharr v. Commonwealth, 646
S.E.2d 453, 456-58 (Va. 2007) (holding that "[the defendant's] reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in [his buccal DNA] sample ended when he voluntarily provided
it to the police for DNA testing and comparison").
276. See Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law's Race to Keep Up
with Technological Change, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 239, 245 ("There is one
aspect of technological change . . . that ha[s] the most direct impact on law. This is
the capacity of new technology to enable new forms of conduct, including altera-
tion of the means by which similar ends are achieved. . . . Some technological
change has a significant impact on what is possible.").
277. Id. at 248.
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is currently possible.278 In turn, society is left dealing with legal
uncertainty.279
Uncertainty is unacceptable when the technology calls into
question basic rights-like the right to privacy-and whether or
how the government is permitted to utilize new technologies to ad-
vance a legitimate governmental interest while still upholding the
rights of those affected. Often, cases involving governmental use of
new technology are litigated long before the legislature addresses
the legal ramifications.2 8 0 Consequently, courts must interpret and
apply existing laws to rule on technology questions, but judges are
often left trying to apply antiquated laws to novel issues.28' Courts
cannot use today's law to address tomorrow's technology-the
courts are limited to interpreting the law as it applies to the facts
278. Id. at 249. Although the legislature may attempt to streamline legislation
when technological advances demand doing so, the legislative processes them-
selves require significant time and cooperation among lawmakers holding differ-
ing political views. This time gap between technological advances and lawmaking
may be interpreted by society as a failure to act in a sufficiently expedient manner,
and as a "failure to take action where new technology is perceived to cause harm,
threaten social values, or require central planning [and] might well lead to claims
that law has fallen behind the times." Id.
279. See id. at 264 ("It has been said that 'law must be contemporary to be
viable.'") (quoting ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING To DoJUSTICE 17 (1969)).
280. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 345, 962-63 (2012)
("[C]oncem about new intrusions on privacy may spur the enactment of legisla-
tion to protect against these intrusions. This is what ultimately happened with re-
spect to wiretapping. After [Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)], Congress
did not leave it to the courts to develop a body of Fourth Amendment case law
governing that complex subject. Instead, Congress promptly enacted a compre-
hensive statute . . . and since that time, the regulation of wiretapping has been
governed primarily by statute and not by case law."). In the case of wiretapping,
Congress did not enact a statute regulating the practice until forty years after the
Court first addressed the issue. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466-69
(1928) (holding that wiretapping does not constitute a Fourth Amendment
search), overruled in part by Katz, 389 U.S. 347; Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 801-04, 82 Stat. 197, 211-25 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2012)).
281. See RONALD DwoluuN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOusLY 22, 28 (1977) (recogniz-
ing that legal rules have "furry edges," and that the rules that come from cases are
grounded in certain legal principles, or standards, relied on by judges in articulat-
ing support for their legal arguments). Chief Justice Taft himself acknowledged
this problem in Olmstead:
Congress may, of course, protect the secrecy of telephone messages by making
them, when intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal trials, by
direct legislation, and thus depart from the common law of evidence. But the
courts may not adopt such a policy by attributing an enlarged and unusual
meaning to the Fourth Amendment.
277 U.S. at 465-66.
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before it.282 Accordingly, court decisions address social and legal
issues arising from new technology relatively quickly, but often in-
adequately. 28 3 The decisions often predate legislation.284 Once
courts create new rules through judicial interpretation, the public is
often left guessing how such rulings, based on narrow and specific
factual circumstances, apply to other situations left unaddressed by
courts and lawmakers. The legislature usually appears content to let
the public bear this burden, allowing the judiciary to create laws
that govern matters better suited for legislative action.
The task of shaping legal arguments is left, not to politicians,
but rather to litigators, because courts necessarily craft legal stan-
dards dealing with technological advancements. Litigators craft cre-
ative arguments, draw parallels between policy considerations of
yesterday's laws and today's problems, and react to issues lawmakers
are unable to foresee or address in a timely manner. Laws that do
not reflect the advances of society either restrict the way technology
may be used or are effectively obsolete.285
A. Privacy, Information, and Technology
The indefinite retention in a police database of the DNA pro-
file of a person who has not been arrested for a serious crime or
convicted of a felony intrudes upon reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy. A person's loss of control over his or her DNA profile in a
networked database of state and local databases is harmful because
it stigmatizes an individual at the discretion of the police. The pri-
vacy interest includes a loss of control over a person's entire DNA
sample, which contains highly sensitive, intimate information. For
example, there are over 6000 genetic disorders that are severely
282. See, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013) (limiting its holding
to the portion of Maryland's statute authorizing the state to collect DNA samples
from arrestees and finding that portion constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment).
283. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (holding that the
attachment of a GPS device to the defendant's car absent a warrant constituted a
Fourth Amendment violation); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding
that the use of a thermal imaging device to detect heat radiating from a house is a
"search" in part because "the technology in question is not in general public use");
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding that an expectation of privacy
in a home's backyard is unreasonable because a backyard can be observed from an
aircraft).
284. See Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr's Mis-
guided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FoRDHAM L. REv. 747, 766 (2005).
285. See Moses, supra note 276, at 264.
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debilitating and stigmatizing. 286 Future testing may include the rap-
idly expanding field of behavioral genetics in its search to establish
causal relationships between genes and a host of adult behaviors
related to criminality, such as mental illness, substance abuse, ag-
gression, and impulsiveness. 287 As one commentator put it:
In its most basic sense, having privacy is having control over
our bodies, our possessions, our intimate environment, and
the information-whether by watching, listening, touching, or
reading-other people can gather about us. The wish for pri-
vacy is the wish to control what is revealed about ourselves and
our intimate world. . . . Privacy is "the condition of being pro-
tected from unwanted access by others-either physical access,
personal information, or attention."288
The basic notion of "privacy" generally "connotes . . . control
over access to the self as well as things close to, intimately con-
nected to, and about the self."2 8 9 Control of one's identity must
perforce include a privacy right to protect one's genetic informa-
tion since DNA is arguably "the human essence-that is, the thing
that makes individuals special and perhaps unique." 290 These are
substantial and compelling aspects of DNA privacy interests.
New technologies, especially those that make personal infor-
mation more accessible, make interaction among individuals
quicker and more convenient, but they also create a risk to individ-
ual privacy-technology brings with it new risks as well as conve-
niences. Today, digital storage of information for indefinite periods
of time increases the likelihood that a person's actions, conversa-
tions, or information intended as private may be obtained by
286. GENETIC DISEASE FOUND., http://geneticdiseasefoundation.org (last vis-
ited Dec. 3, 2014); see also NICHOLAS WRIGHT GILLHAM, GENES, CHROMOSOMES, AND
DISEASE: FROM SIMPLE TRAITS, TO COMPLEX TRAITS, TO PERSONALIZED MEDICINE 19
(2011) ("More than 6,000 single gene disorders are currently known . . .
287. See Moses, supra note 276, at 249.
288. JANNA MALAMUD SMITH, PRIVATE MATTERS: IN DEFENSE OF THE PERSONAL
LIFE 59 (1997) (quoting SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT
AND REVELATION 10-11 (1982)).
289. Sonia Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a Deeper Under-
standing of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 737, 746 (2004).
290. Anita L. Allen, Genetic Privacy: Emerging Concepts and Values, in GENETIC
SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALIY IN THE GENETIC ERA 31, 49
(Mark A. Rothstein ed. 1997); see also Jonathan Kahn, Biotechnology and the Legal
Constitution of the Self Managing Identity in Science, the Market, and Society, 51 HAST.
L.J. 909, 910 (2000) (arguing that autonomy and self-identity are essential compo-
nents of the genetic privacy interest in DNA).
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others.291 Such recordkeeping practices allow information about
people, in terms of both who they are and what they do, to be ac-
cessed by others for decades or perhaps longer.292
Although privacy has different meanings depending on the
context in which the term is used, an overall concept of the exis-
tence of individual privacy is universal.293 The law fails to keep pace
with technology in numerous fields, even on the international
stage. 294 In response, many governments have adopted privacy
codes that "seek to regulate collection and use of personal data
held on file by government and private institutions."295 Recognizing
the law's gross shortcomings has led to certain protections regard-
ing DNA databases on the national and state levels; however, local
governments have failed to follow suit and protect their citizens
from DNA collection and storage processes that, if attempted at the
federal level, would violate federal privacy rights.296
In the last century, technology has given the government the
ability to peer into private areas of individuals' lives through the use
of wiretapping,297 thermal imaging,298 GPS tracking,299 and DNA
collection,300 forcing the Supreme Court to weigh in on whether or
not these use of these technologies by law enforcement is constitu-
tionally permissible. The law's inability to protect citizens from law
291. See James B. Rule, Privacy Codes and Institutional Record Keeping: Procedural
Versus Strategic Approaches, 37 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 119, 120 (2012) ("Given the grav-
ity of the consequences, it is no surprise that conflict and controversy have come to
surround these [recordkeeping] processes and that legislation and policy have
grown up in response.").
292. Id. ("Nearly everyone now appreciates how consequential such record
keeping is for one's life chances-that is, how much it matters who compiles
records, what information can be included, who can share access to such data, and
what kinds of decisions can be made on their basis.").
293. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(I) (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/en/docu-
ments/udhr/. The concept of a universal idea refers to the general agreement
"about the most general and abstract propositions" about that idea. RONALD DWOR-
KIN, IAw's EMPIRE 70 (1986).
294. See Vivek Wadhwa, Our Lagging Laws, MIT TECH. REv., July/August 2014,
at 11.
295. Rule, supra note 291, at 120. Because of the ability to collect and store
personal information, "virtually all of the world's liberal societies have adopted
some such measures." Id.
296. See discussion supra Parts II.A-B.
297. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
298. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
299. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
300. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 195 (2013).
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enforcement agencies' overreaching use of new technologies has
led to outcries for protection, as the use of such technological ad-
vances often implicates the constitutional right to be free from un-
reasonable searches and seizures. 01 In the absence of legislative
action, the courts have interpreted law enforcement's use of tech-
nologies against the backdrop of society's conception of privacy,
and since societal conceptions evolve over time, the outcome of
each case has been somewhat inconsistent and often
unpredictable.3 0 2
B. Ethical Issues
1. Expansion of Underregulated DNA Databases
Along the Lines of Race
Many factors may lead minorities to be disproportionately rep-
resented in local and state DNA databases. First, there are multiple
studies that show that police officials on the local level, for example
in San Francisco, underreport arrests of minorities.s03 Further, mi-
norities and people of color are disproportionately represented in
the criminal justice system.30 4 This overrepresentation correlates di-
rectly with an overrepresentation of people of color in familial
searches given that minorities have a greater and unequal
probability of having their DNA collected and stored upon ar-
rest.3 05 With the known bias against minority groups and people of
color, some scholars believe the familial searches themselves are
discriminatory because collection of DNA and the arrest itself is dis-
301. See cases cited supra notes 297-300 and accompanying text.
302. Id.
303. See, e.g., SF Police Underreport Arrest Rates for Latinos, Asians, THE BAY CITI-
ZEN (Aug. 14, 2012, 12:01 AM), https://www.baycitizen.org/news/policing/sf-po-
lice-underreport-arrest-rates/ (finding misclassification of arrestees was the reason
for underreporting of minority arrests).
304. See Murphy, supra note 208, at 321.
305. See id. ("First, familial searches of convicted offender and arrestee
databases exacerbate the actual and apparent disparities of the criminal justice
system, in which people of color are disproportionately represented. Second, the
dependence on racial categorization in interpreting DNA typing results transmits a
biological determinism about race that is not supported by science and that risks
formally inscribing within the justice system inaccurate biases under the legitimiz-
ing mantel of scientific truth. And lastly, this widespread acceptance of racial and
ethnic categorization as a means of quantifying DNA results (say, allelic frequen-
cies) opens the door to a kind of twenty-first century racial eugenics in which
crime and criminology are viewed largely as functions of genetics and biology.");
see also Projects: DNA Databases and justice, GENERATIONS A-HEAD, http://www.genera
tions-ahead.org/projects/dna-databases-and-justice (last visited Nov. 9, 2014).
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cretionary and based on criminal suspicion, which is led by a per-
son's race or ethnicity alone in some cases.306
Although the fear of racial discrimination does exist, the U.S.
Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) insists that DNA specimens in
DNA databases do not indicate race and that there is no ability to
specify a particular race in a search.307 Moreover, the BJA empha-
sizes that law enforcement must comply with constitutional law and
other legal ramifications to successfully seize biological evidence; if
they do not comply, law enforcement runs the risk of "subsequent
suppression of evidence at a trial."308 The problem with the BJA's
assertion is that many local law enforcement agencies have no
guidelines directing the collection of DNA and the practice of fa-
milial searches.309
The concern regarding racial inequality in the criminal justice
system has been evident for at least the past 200 years. Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court has held that complaints about the personal
motivations of the police are irrelevant under the Fourth Amend-
ment.3 10 Thus, if a local law enforcement agent detains an individ-
ual and collects DNA samples upon an arrest motivated by personal
bias, there is the possibility that a court would find that the law
enforcement agent would be justified by doing so and protected
under the notion that he or she acted on the basis of probable
cause.3" This idea is also connected to the fear that crimes will be
underreported: if minorities and people of color ran a higher risk
of having their DNA profiles abused by the familial search process,
it would be no surprise if they became less likely to report crime.
2. The Crime Gene
The resurgence of the idea of a biological root for criminality
has resulted in a massive and disturbing potential for abuse of DNA
databases. This troubling ethical question is yet another reason citi-
306. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 208, at 321; Jennifer Mnookin, The Perils of
Expanding DNA Searches to Relatives, UCLA NEWSROOM (May 8, 2007), http://news
room.ucla.edu/stories/070508_dna-perils.
307. See GLOBALJUST. INFO. SHARING INITIATIVE, AN INTRODUCTION TO FAMIL-
IAL DNA SEARCHING FOR STATE, LoCAL AND TRIBAL JUSTICE AGENCIES: ISSUES FOR
CONSIDERATION (2012) (analyzing the role of race in DNA databases and familial
searches).
308. Id at 4.
309. See discussion supra Part II.A.
310. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 806 (1996) ("[T]his Court's
cases foreclose the argument that ulterior motives can invalidate police conduct
justified on the basis of probable cause.").
311. See id.
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zens may find themselves targeted in criminal investigations. James
Watson, one of the discoverers of the double helix structure of
DNA, aptly commented on this possible concern:
A DNA sample taken for fingerprinting purposes can, in prin-
ciple, be used for a lot more than merely proving identity: it
can tell you a lot about me-whether I carry mutations for dis-
orders like cystic fibrosis, sickle-cell disease, or Tay-Sachs dis-
ease. Some time in the not so distant future, it may even tell
you whether I carry the genetic variations predisposing me to
schizophrenia or alcoholism-or traits even more likely to dis-
turb the peace. Might the authorities, for instance, one day
subject me to a more intensive scrutiny than would otherwise
be the case simply because I have a mutation in the
monoamine oxidase gene that reduces the activity of the en-
zyme? Some research suggests that this mutation may predis-
pose me to antisocial behavior under certain circumstances.
Could genetic profiling indeed become a new tool for preemp-
tive action in law enforcement? Philip K Dick's 1956 story
(which inspired the 2002 movie) "The Minority Report" may
not be such far-fetched science fiction as we like to imagine.3 12
In his provocative book, The Anatomy of Violence, Adrian Raine
details how the scientific community is indeed now returning to a
paradigm of human behavior-and in particular criminal behav-
ior-that includes biological roots.3 13 Raine argues that the study of
the biological roots of criminal behavior, or "neurocriminology,"
will lead to "effective" techniques, such as preventive detention,
that will reduce crime.314 History is full of examples where science
has been used to justify heinous mistreatment of groups of individu-
als. In the late 1800s, the Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso
proposed that criminals were evolutionary throwbacks who could
be identified by primitive features like sloping foreheads and large
jaws, and he went on to propose an evolutionary hierarchy of the
races, with northern Italians at the apex.3 15 Such ideas inspired
Mussolini's racial laws in the 1930s and are at the core of some of
the ugliest social movements of our time-including forced sterili-
zation of "imbeciles" in the United States through the 1970s.3 1 6 As
312. JAMES D. WATSON & ANDREW BERRY, DNA: THE SECRET OF LIFE 273
(2003).
313. See ADRIAN RAINE, THE ANATOMY OF VIOLENCE (2013).
314. Id.
315. See generally CESARE LoMBROSO, CRIMINAL MAN (1876).
316. See, e.g., Frederick Kunkle, Sometimes, Sorry May Not Be Enough, WASH.
PosT, Jan. 30, 2013, at B1.
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the pendulum continues to swing back to a biological basis for
criminal behavior, the notion of a database of DNA from criminals
is entirely foreseeable and will become an irresistible source of data
to study for correlations between genes and criminal behavior.3 1 7
The potential for misuse of DNA information is heightened when
the executive branch is permitted, without legislative oversight or
judicial approval, to engage in the DNA collection practices at issue
in this Article.
C. Chilling Effects
Familial searching of an individual's DNA sample raises fears
about intrusions of privacy and potential abuse at all levels. How-
ever, these fears are greater at the local level because of the lack of
regulations governing local practices, especially because those prac-
tices are usually only limited by controlling constitutional author-
ity.3 18 Further, the chilling effect of underreporting crime would
likely be more prominent at the local level where individuals are
more likely to encounter their local law enforcement, as opposed to
state or federal agencies. This would be especially likely for victims
of crimes where DNA is needed to help catch the perpetrator, and
for individuals who would likely turn themselves in for crimes they
personally committed. Further, knowledge of familial search prac-
tices can hinder community support in crime investigations. Indi-
viduals may be less likely to persuade a family member to turn
himself in if there is a chance that the individual will be personally
tracked through a DNA sample given by the family member. Al-
though there is a notion that innocent individuals have nothing to
fear because familial DNA would not result in a hit, there is still the
risk of wrongful convictions due to "the multitude of possible errors
that can arise during laboratory analysis and data entry; and the
great potential for corruption and fabrication."3 1 9 Thus, underre-
porting of crimes could be an inevitable result of the natural desire
to preserve one's privacy.
Moreover, courts have held that CODIS is not designed for in-
tentional familial searches and that local DNA databases are
modeled after CODIS. In United States v. Mitchell, the court relied
on expert opinions that expressed familial searches would not pro-
317. It is noteworthy that the Maryland statute expressly states that one of the
legislative purposes of the Maryland DNA Collection Act is to conduct "research."
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFErY § 2-505 (a) (5) (West 2013).
318. See GLOBAL JUST. INFO. SHARING INITIATIVE, supra note 307.
319. Kirsten Edwards, Cold Hit Complacency: The Dangers of DNA Databases Re-
examined, 18 CURRENT ISSUES CRIM. JUST. 92, 92 (2006-07).
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duce useful information. 320 If courts have expressed skepticism
about familial search practices, it would not be farfetched for indi-
viduals to feel the same. At the very least, individuals may feel per-
sonally violated as the most intimate aspect of their being-their
genetic makeup-is exposed against their will.
Without regulation governing these local databases, people
may fear that insurance companies will gain access to the databases.
Civil rights and privacy groups are justifiably concerned that the
local databases will heighten genetic discrimination and lead to in-
dividuals being denied coverage based on findings from stored sam-
ples.32 1 Although these databases primarily serve law enforcement
currently, it is not unconceivable that information may be shared or
even sold in the future.
Local DNA databases can also hinder the advancement of
clinical research. Individuals may be hesitant to produce their DNA
for studies or research if there is a fear their sample could be
shared with law enforcement. Individuals commonly volunteer to
share their DNA for research advancements and to be used for
other purposes. For example, in 2003, Comprehensive Drug Test-
ing Inc. and Quest Diagnostics Inc. collected DNA samples as part
of a Major League Baseball survey to study the use of steroids by
baseball players. 322 The team owners and players involved volunta-
rily produced their DNA and agreed in their labor contracts that
test results and players' identities would remain confidential.323
Upon the government's investigation into a local lab cooperative
and its role in distributing illegal steroids to players, the DNA sam-
ples were seized, leading to investigations of some of the players
whose identities were disclosed to authorities.324 Most importantly,
the Ninth Circuit initially held that the government could do so,
triggering a subsequent Ninth Circuit panel to raise concerns about
the impact on players' privacy.32 5
320. 652 F.3d 387, 409 n.19 (3d Cir. 2011) ("[Mlost experts acknowledge that
the current iteration of the CODIS software does a poor job of identifying true
leads in familial searches.") (citing Murphy, supra note 208, at 300).
321. See Phillip Bohannon et al., Cryptographic Approaches to Privacy in Forensic
DNA Databases, in PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY 373 (2000) (suggesting that DNA sam-
ples can show an individual's health status and deter insurers from covering cer-
tain individuals based on their genetic makeup).
322. See 9th Circuit: Feds Can Keep Seized MLB Drug Test Results: United States v.
Comprehensive Drug Testing, 5 ANDREWs PRIVAcY LITIG. REP. 4 (2007).
323. See id.
324. See id.
325. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing Inc., 473 F.3d 915, 919
(9th Cir. 2006) (ruling, as a divided court, that the U.S. government may retain
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IV.
EXPANDED DATABASES REQUIRE
EXPANDED REGULATION
Proponents of DNA databases have an easy argument. DNA
analysis is an effective law enforcement tool,3 2 6 but the analysis
takes time, particularly if it has to be performed by a state-run lab
that handles analyses for multiple local jurisdictions.327 Local com-
munities have a vested interest in getting criminals off the streets, a
task that is better accomplished sooner rather than later. According
to proponents, the tangible crime-fighting benefits of expanding
DNA databases at the local level generally outweigh the intangible,
fuzzy ethical and privacy problems such an unregulated expansion
brings.328 This expansion is not likely to slow in the wake of the
Supreme Court's endorsement of DNA sampling as a type of stan-
dard booking procedure in Maryland v. King.329
confidential drug test data seized during raids on two testing laboratories in 2004
for 110 athletes), opinion withdrawn and superseded on rehg, 513 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir.
2008), reh ' en banc, 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009), opinion revised and superseded, 621
F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010). After extensive subsequent litigation, the district court
ordered sequestration and the return of copies of the evidence, a ruling that was
upheld by an en banc Ninth Circuit panel. Comprehensive Drug Testing Inc., 621 F.3d
at 1174 ("Apart from preclusion, however, we cannot see howJudge Mahan abused
his discretion by concluding that 'equitable considerations' required sequestration
and the return of copies. The risk to the players associated with disclosure, and
with that the ability of the Players Association to obtain voluntary compliance with
drug testing from its members in the future, is very high. Indeed, some players
appear to have already suffered this very harm as a result of the government's
seizure. Judge Mahan certainly did not abuse his broad discretion in balancing
these equities.") (citations omitted).
326. But see Christine Rosen, Liberty, Privacy, and DNA Databases, NEw ATLAN-
TIS, Spring 2003, at 37, 40 ("[T]he evidence of DNA's effectiveness as a crime-
fighting tool is at once impressive and ambiguous, depending on how the genetic
information is used."). A match in a database, on its own, indicates nothing about
guilt or innocence but only that two samples are very similar. Guilt and innocence
stand as conclusions at the end of an inference, aided by DNA analysis, made by a
fallible human being, that may or may not be particularly strong. See, e.g., Osagie
K. Obasogie, High-Tech, High-Risk Forensics, N.Y. TIMEs,July 25, 2013, at A27 (noting
cases where DNA database hits and the results of crime scene contamination led to
arrests of innocent persons).
327. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 14 (noting the dramatic crime-solving ben-
efits of local databases and the frustration among local law enforcement personnel
regarding how long state crime labs can take to analyze and enter DNA samples,
which can be months).
328. Cf, e.g., id. (quoting Doug Muldoon, Palm Bay police chief, describing
his city's database as "good for law enforcement and good for the community").
329. 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). New York University law professor Erin Murphy
characterized the ruling this way: "'King is a green light.... It's a ringing endorse-
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As more local law enforcement agencies face real or perceived
exigencies regarding community-wide crime prevention, they will
push for ever-expanding DNA data on those in their communities.
Regulations setting the ethical parameters of the content and use of
these databases must keep pace and must cover federal, state, and
local databases. It is incongruous to think that the policies justifying
federal or state regulation don't apply equally to local databases.
Effective regulation of DNA law enforcement databases must
strike the right balance between ensuring effective law enforcement
and guarding the concerns about the use of unregulated DNA
databases.33 0 DNA law enforcement databases give the government
a unique and exclusive privilege to search a person's most inti-
mately identifying data without that person's approval or knowl-
edge. With that privilege comes the need to use the power
appropriately and in line with an individual right of privacy. Appro-
priate regulations must be crafted to protect against government
overreach. Where that institutional right goes largely unregulated,
or is regulated in minimal and ineffective ways, there is a greater
likelihood for both real and potential abuses of the genetic infor-
mation stored in DNA databases. Effective regulation should safe-
guard privacy rights in genetic information and prevent, limit, or
mitigate actual and potential abuses that result from institutional
control over that information.
To varying degrees, every state regulates the genetic informa-
tion it acquires, manages, and searches at the statewide level for law
enforcement purposes. But, as previously discussed in this Article,
the state statutes regulating the management of DNA databases are
anything but uniform and most local databases are not subject to
any regulatory guidelines.331 At a minimum, the regulation of a lo-
cal DNA database should be consistent with the regulation of that
jurisdiction's statewide database. Amending an already-existing stat-
utory scheme to achieve consistency across databases would not be
ment of DNA testing, and many law enforcement agencies would see this as a dra-
matic opportunity to expand DNA collection.'" Goldstein, supra note 14.
330. Cf United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 871 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting) ("New technologies test the judicial conscience. On the one hand,
they hold out the promise of more effective law enforcement and the hope that we
will be delivered from the scourge of crime. On the other hand, they often achieve
these ends by intruding, in ways never before imaginable, into the realms pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment.").
331. See supra Parts I.C, II. According to the head of the Sacramento District
Attorney's crime lab, Jill Spriggs, "There really are no rules as to what you can
specifically keep. The forensic community is all over the board." Goldstein, supra
note 14.
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difficult, and Alaska, Missouri, and Washington have already explic-
itly done so.332
In order to prevent institutional abuse of local DNA databases
and to help protect privacy interests in the genetic information
stored in those local DNA databases, effective regulation should
have both procedural and strategic components in place.3 33 The
procedural component should focus on already-acquired genetic
samples and encompass the proper use, maintenance, and storage
of samples in the database. The strategic component should deal
with which genetic samples are entered into and remain in the
database; its focus would thus be on policies affecting the acquisi-
tion and retention of genetic samples in the database.334
Regulations should contain robust expungement provisions to
protect an individual's privacy interest in the government's use of
her personally identifying information. These provisions could pre-
vent many of the abuses of law enforcement DNA databases.335 If a
DNA sample that qualifies for expungement is removed from the
database on the front end, there is nothing to abuse subsequently.
The ideal expungement policy would give enough room for effec-
tive law enforcement while adequately protecting valuable privacy
interests.
Criminal investigations may lead to the collection of a wide
range of individually identifying DNA information, but casework
samples of known persons should not be entered in a searchable
local DNA database. DNA samples of known persons should only be
permitted in local DNA databases that are collected pursuant to a
state's DNA collection law. Biological samples of victims, mere sus-
pects, and even those who voluntarily offer their cheeks for swab-
332. Alaska, Missouri, and Washington each have "no conflict" statutory provi-
sions that ensure consistency in managing both the local and state DNA'databases.
ALASKA STAT. § 44.41.035(d) (2014); Mo. REV. STA. § 650.057 (2013); WASH. REV.
CODE § 43.43.758 (2014). Although the logistical cost is low, implementing consis-
tency in a currently inconsistent system may be difficult, depending on the size of
the database and the number of samples subject to expungement at the local level.
333. See Rule, supra note 291, at 121, for an explanation of strategic
approaches.
334. While most statutes contain provisions relating to retention, few statutes
provide for oversight of DNA sample collection. See Samuels, supra note 42, at 22.
335. See, e.g., Amato v. Dist. Att'y for the Cape and Islands Dist., 952 N.E.2d
400, 410 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (holding that law enforcement's refusal to expunge
an elimination profile in a database derived from a DNA sample voluntarily pro-
vided to police during a homicide investigation constituted an "unreasonable, sub-
stantial, and serious interference with [the defendant's] privacy" sufficient to state
a claim under a state civil law restricting extraneous collection and storage of infor-
mation by governmental units).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
6932014]
NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW [Vol. 69:639
bing for elimination purposes should not be included without
meeting statutory requirements. Such a statute should require in-
formed consent confirmed in an authenticated writing, a reasona-
ble basis for the police to request the consent, and the opportunity
for the person consenting to qualify for expungement upon re-
quest. The state should bear the burden of expunging the record
from all national, state, and local databases. Any match that occurs
after the date the sample qualifies for expungement should not be
used for any purpose. DNA samples collected pursuant to a warrant
or court order should be searched in the local and state databases
(and the national databank, if a one-time search is permitted) and
should be destroyed if the person later qualifies for expungement
or if no criminal action has begun within a defined period of time
after the collection.
The application of a particular expungement policy to a partic-
ular type of DNA sample should be mapped along the spectrum
between effective law enforcement and the extent of privacy inter-
ests implicated. At one end of the spectrum, convicted felons
should receive the least amount of privacy protection and generally
should not have the option of being removed from DNA databases.
At the other end of the spectrum are voluntarily submitted samples
collected for purely elimination purposes; these individuals should
receive the most privacy protection since there is no reason to con-
nect them with the crime being investigated. Once the criminal in-
vestigatory interest ends or the duration of the investigation reaches
a defined point, DNA samples from non-qualifying individuals
should qualify for automatic expungement.3 36 The same expunge-
ment policy that is applied to elimination samples should apply to
victim and suspect samples as well. Once a case is closed, there
should be no legitimate law enforcement reason for retaining the
sample beyond the specific context of the investigation for which
the sample was drawn, analyzed, and centralized.
Arrested individuals are arguably entitled to less privacy protec-
tion than elimination, victim, or suspect individuals, but to more
protection than convicted individuals. Just as the level of justifica-
tion required to arrest someone for a serious crime is sufficient to
warrant an intrusion upon their privacy interests in terms of search
and seizure law, it should be sufficient to warrant a comparable in-
336. Retaining elimination samples may save time in investigating future
crimes, and law enforcement certainly has an interest in preventing future crimes.
However, the better policy would be to limit the retention of such samples to the
investigation for which they were acquired. This would prevent open-ended ge-
netic surveillance that would invade the privacy of non-suspected persons.
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trusion regarding the retention of someone's genetic information
in a public government database only after there has been a judicial
finding of probable cause on the qualifying offense to detain the
person for trial. If the qualifying charge does not result in a convic-
tion, then the individual should qualify for automatic
expungement.
The purpose of DNA analysis and recordkeeping in the law en-
forcement context is simply to provide a method of identifica-
tion.3 3 7 The goal is to determine, from the genetic information
gathered, who the information belongs to-specifically, to identify
an individual using a very basic genetic marker.338 Conversely, the
particular purposes to which DNA analysis and management are
put in the private sphere vary, but the general goal is to extract as
many details as possible about the person from the genetic sample
to create a complete genetic profile.339
Private company DNA databases are likely among the most un-
regulated databases around and contain much more genetic infor-
mation about the individual than is necessary or permitted for law
enforcement purposes like identification.340 Yet allowing law en-
forcement to tap into these databases essentially allows an end-run
around regulations that pertain only to law enforcement-created
samples and database inclusion. The genetic information from pri-
vate databases is likely to contain much more comprehensive per-
sonal information than is necessary only to identify the individual.
Generally, only internal policies of private databases guide how
and when they share information with law enforcement.34 1 Regula-
tions that restrict the flow of information between the private and
law enforcement spheres would help safeguard against abuse and
privacy violations. These regulations should prohibit law enforce-
ment from buying, obtaining, or otherwise using private DNA infor-
mation, whether through voluntary (e.g., direct solicitation) or
involuntary (e.g., subpoena) means. This would prevent the crimi-
nal investigatory use of information obtained for non-criminal in-
vestigatory reasons.
337. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2012) (titling the section that authorizes the
FBI to create and maintain CODIS "Index to facilitate law enforcement exchange
of DNA identification information").
338. See id.
339. See, e.g., supra note 154.
340. See Rosen, supra note 326, at 42.
341. Cf Sarah B. Berson, Debating DNA Collection, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., Novem-
ber 2009, at 9 ("[F]ederal and state privacy laws and penalties that apply to crime
labs are stringent-far more stringent than the rules governing private entities that
collect blood and saliva for medical or insurance purposes.").
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Similarly, law enforcement agencies should not be able to
share information with private companies. At all levels, government
DNA databases should be prohibited from selling, licensing, or oth-
erwise making available for non-criminal investigatory purposes the
genetic information under their control. Because the purposes for
acquiring the genetic data should be consistent with their use, pri-
vate companies should not be able to use compulsorily obtained
DNA information used for criminal investigations.
Further, there must be reporting requirements on the collec-
tion practices of police to document the effect of different qualify-
ing offense or convictions across various demographics of race,
class, age, sex, and geography. The reporting requirements should
include disclosure of any discrepancies in the collection of DNA
samples and the management and security of the samples and data,
such as whether information is stored in the cloud or on an internal
server. Police department procedures that govern any DNA
database should be deemed public documents that are subject to
disclosure upon a public information act request. Additionally, an
individual should have the right to inspect the information con-
tained in the database and to challenge its accuracy. These proce-
dural components are essential protections for individual rights.
CONCLUSION
There should be widespread public support for closely regu-
lated DNA databases at the national and state levels. There should
also be public acceptance of the premise that an individual who has
been convicted or charged with a serious crime has a lesser interest
in his DNA profile than the government. So long as law enforce-
ment's focus is solving crimes with identifying genetic features that
are not associated with any physical, medical, or behavioral trait,
the public may be comfortable with this lesser expectation of pri-
vacy. Public support may shift, however, as awareness grows about
underregulated state and local DNA databases expanding collec-
tion and retention practices to include crime victim DNA, volunta-
rily provided elimination samples, and surreptitiously collected
DNA from persons of interest who may never be charged with a
crime. However intermingled with good intentions, the expansion
of underregulated local and state DNA databases represents:
[An] alarming trend whereby the privacy and dignity of our
citizens [are] being whittled away by . . . imperceptible steps.
Taken individually, each step may be of little consequence. But
when viewed as a whole, there begins to emerge a society quite
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unlike any we have seen-a society in which government may
intrude into the secret regions of man's life at will.342
These underregulated state and local DNA databases already
intrude upon the privacy rights of crime victims, and the rest of us
might not be far behind. As Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit
cautioned, "Privacy erodes first at the margins, but once eliminated,
its protections are lost for good, and the resultant damage cannot
be undone."343
In summary, regulation of both state and local DNA databases
should exhibit certain minimum features in order to strike a
healthy balance between effective law enforcement and the protec-
tion of individual privacy interests. Collection practices should in-
clude informed consent forms, limitations on future use, and the
opportunity to expunge and/or automatic expungement. Regula-
tory policies should be consistently applied to both the state and
local management and use of DNA databases. Automatic expunge-
ment policies should be coupled with statutory suppression and ap-
plied to different types of DNA samples as follows: elimination,
victim, and suspect samples should not be retained or searched in
LDIS and should be automatically expunged once the related crim-
inal action has concluded; convicted offender samples and arrestee
samples should be automatically expunged if a conviction does not
result for the qualifying offense or a conviction is overturned, re-
versed, pardon, and there is no retrial; and convicted felon samples
should be subject to automatic expungement at the conclusion of
the sentence or probation. Finally, private entities should not be
permitted to use DNA records stored in a law enforcement database
for the purpose of predicting medical or behavioral traits or linking
DNA records to other databases of information, whether govern-
ment or private, such as financial records, voting records, motor
vehicle records, and Choice Point style databases.
As DNA databases expand their coverage, so too will they con-
tinue to advance beyond subpar regulations that are poorly posi-
tioned to keep databases in check. In response, meaningful
restrictions should balance the need to solve crimes with the other-
wise overlooked privacy interests.
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dissenting).
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